May 13th, 2013
The last few weeks of mine have been incredible. My wife graduated with her BS in Communications specializing in PR and Advertising and graduated with my Master’s in Philosophical Studies. These few weeks have allowed our humanity to express every range of the human emotion, which is a good thing.
As we prepare to move to Scotland for my PhD in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, we are seeing family and traveling places before we go. One of my main goals was to attain an adjunct position with a university so I can be a professor and work online. Well, I am no longer teaching intro. to philosophy courses at a University, which is sad. However, God had different plans for me–at least for the time being. I’m very humbled to announce that I have been offered and have taken a position with William Lane Craig’s ministry, Reasonable Faith.
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February 27th, 2013
The following is a guest post by Kegan Shaw. Kegan is currently in the MA in Philosophical Studies program at Liberty University and his research is in epistemological naturalism and rationalism.
Looking back on the Feb. 2nd debate between William Craig and Alex Rosenberg, while much said was in keeping with good sense, there did appear to be some confusion about the notion of epistemological naturalism. It seems William Lane Craig confused or took together to be synonymous the terms scientism and epistemological naturalism (EN). These terms are importantly distinct and should therefor be kept that way. To make a statement of distinction right off, scientism is an epistemological theory, while EN is not strictly so.
The confusion stems from Craig’s taking epistemological naturalism to be equivalent to scientism, while proceeding to wrongly criticize epistemological naturalism as one would properly criticize scientism. For instance, Craig says in his Feb. 26 podcast that epistemological naturalism is the view that “science alone gives us knowledge and truth.” Craig’s debate powerpoint defined the same term as the view that “science is the only source of knowledge.” However, these are proper definitions of scientism, not EN.
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September 24th, 2012
I was listening to William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith podcast on Sean Carroll on Science and God Part 1 this morning as I was walking from the parking lot into my office at University today, and I was quite surprised to hear a generalization Dr. Craig made concerning intelligent design.
Dr. Craig discusses how no models of the universe involve God. (This discussion begins around the 7 minute mark.) I think he’s correct in that we don’t have a physical theory of the universe that uses God as an entity in its explanation. For instance, you’ll find no entity in the standard model of particle physics that denotes God. However, Craig says that you do find this in the proponents of intelligent design theory “who want to postulate God as an entity in a scientific theory–that God would be like a quark, or a black hole, or a quantum field. He would be a theoretical entity postulated in a scientific theory.”
I have no doubt that there are intelligent design proponents, i.e. [young earth] creationists, who do this, but importing creationism into intelligent design theory strips ID for what it actually says.
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July 8th, 2012
Reblogged from Chuck Norris.
[F]or too many years I was in rebellion to God. Now I’m a rebel with a cause for God and for grass-roots America.
I no longer fit the mold. I’m not a liberal actor from Hollywood. I’m not politically correct, in my opinions or my practice. And though I’m concerned with what people think, I will not compromise the truth in any form to cater to others, even with religion and politics.
Those who would merely brand me on ”the right” are oversimplifying and running from the real issue. I’m not the issue! None of us are. Jesus is, especially during Christmas.
And the question He asked the people of His day still needs to be answered by those in ours: ”Who do people say that I am?”
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July 5th, 2012
In a correct deductive argument if the premises are true the conclusion is true regardless of whether or not further evidence is considered. There must be a reasonable connection or relationship between the conditions in a deductive argument (in the instance of implication). Consider the argument, as modus ponens, that if the moon’s core is made of cheese then my desk is made out of mahogany. What relationship do these two conditions have? The truth-value is valid (F-T-T). However, I recognize that this is merely a preference, which is, at times, convenient. When making a novel explanans and prediction the relationship between the conditions may not be epistemically evident.
There are generally three options, which are often considered as an explanation for the fine-tuning data: chance, necessity, a combination of chance and necessity, or a fine-tuner. One immediate problem in implementing explanatory options in a deductive manner is that the first premise may be false wherein it may be lacking in options and the argument still is valid. When these options are used in a [strict] deductive argument it may appear as:
- The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
- It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
- Therefore, it is due to design.
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June 18th, 2012
The Borde-Vilenkin-Guth Theorem states that any universe, which has, on average, a rate of expansion greater 1 that system had to have a finite beginning. This would apply in any multiverse scenario as well. There are four exceptions to the theorem.*
Time reversal at singularity
(Regarding BVG): The Intuitive reason why de Sitter inflation cannot be past eternal is that in the full de Sitter space, exponential expansion is preceded by exponential contraction. Such a contracting phase is not part of standard inflationary models, and does not appear to be consistent with the physics of inflation. If thermalized regions were able to form all the way to past infinity in the contracting spacetime, the whole universe would have been thermalized before inflationary expansion could begin. In our analysis we will exclude the possibility of such a contracting phase by considering spacetimes for which the past region obeys an averaged expansion condition, by which we mean that the average expansion rate in the past is greater than zero: Havg > 0. (Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin 2003, p1)
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