Posts tagged ‘universe’

February 8th, 2012

Word of the Week Wednesday: Multiverse

by Max Andrews

The Word of the Week is: Multiverse

Definition: The term to designate the existence of many worlds or universes.  Contrary to just one world, a uni-verse, there are many worlds, a multi-verse.

More about the term: The multiverse is not monolithic but it is modeled after the contemporary understanding of an inflationary model of the beginning of this universe suggesting a plurality of worlds.  Max Tegmark has championed the most prominent versions of the multiverse.[1]  There are four levels of the multiverse.

  1.  Level One:  The level one is, for the most part, more space beyond the observable universe.  So, theoretically, if we were to go to the “edge” of the universe there would be more space.  Having this model as a version of the multiverse may be misleading because there is still only one volume, landscape, or system involved.  A generic prediction of cosmological inflation is an infinite space, which contains Hubble volumes (what we see in our universe) realizing in all conditions—including an identical copy of each of us about 10^10^29 meters away.[2]
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December 31st, 2011

An Outline of Tegmark’s Four Levels of the Multiverse

by Max Andrews

Contemporary physics seem to indicate that there are good reasons, theoretically and physically, for an idea that there is a plurality of worlds.  This concept has come to be understood as the multiverse.  The multiverse is not monolithic but it is modeled after the contemporary understanding of an inflationary model of the beginning of this universe.  Max Tegmark has championed the most prominent versions of the multiverse.[1]  Tegmark has made a four-way distinction.

Tegmark’s first version of the multiverse is called the level one multiverse.  The level one is, for the most part, more space beyond the observable universe.  So, theoretically, if we were to go to the “edge” of the universe there would be more space.  Having this model as a version of the multiverse may be misleading because there is still only one volume, landscape, or system involved.  A generic prediction of cosmological inflation is an infinite space, which contains Hubble volumes (what we see in our universe) realizing in all conditions—including an identical copy of each of us about 10^10^29 meters away.[2]

September 20th, 2011

Divine Simplicity and the Multiverse–Thomas Aquinas Approved

by Max Andrews

For Thomas, there are four identity claims for God and simplicity.

  1. God is not distinct from his nature.
  2. God’s properties are not distinct from one another.
  3. God’s nature is not distinct from his existence.
  4. God has not properties distinct from his nature.

Now, I’m not a proponent of the doctrine of simplicity, I think it has its problems.  However, I want to consider the fourth claim.  The problem with the fourth claim is that it claims God is immutable and possesses no accidental properties.  Consider the actual world.  I’m currently wearing khakis, a dress shirt, tie, sweater vest, and glasses.  Suppose in another possible world, W, I am wearing jeans.  In world W2 I am not wearing glasses and I’ve got perfect eyesight.  In world W3 I don’t even exist.  In these worlds no obvious contradiction obtains.  I think it would be quite difficult to deny these worlds as being possible.  Given these possibilities it seems that God does have accidental properties when considering worlds W-W3 as they relate to the actual world since God’s knowledge and relation to me in these worlds would very (accidentally).

Perhaps, if the physical reality does exist in a manner of some form of the multiverse (at least Level 2 or greater) then God may perhaps be simple and this objection may not hold.  Thomas’ lack of distinction between properties may hold true and what appears to be accidental may just be a form of the actualization of the whole essence of God.  Perhaps all worlds W-W3 are actualized, either previously, presently, or in the future.  This, of course, doesn’t necessarily suggest that every possible state of affairs are actualized, it merely commits to the actualization of God’s essential desires/nature.

 

September 5th, 2011

Living in the Multiverse–Is it Science?

by Max Andrews

Is the multiverse hypothesis a legitimate scientific theory?  That is, are there regularities that illuminate and reflect underlying laws of nature by testing these laws and making predictions that can be either verified or refuted by experimentation and observation?  Generally, these are the guidelines for something to be scientific, can it be verified and falsified?  Before I continue, we need to make a distinction in two fundamental philosophies of science: instrumentalism and realism.

Instrumentalism:  Scientific theories are not intended to be literally true and accepting a theory requires us to believe only that its observational consequences are true.  Observation statements are literally true and science is only about these statements and the observations that verify them.  A few strengths of this philosophy is that it doesn’t conflict with common sense realism; we can believe in straightforward observations.  Plus, it’s more modest and non-commital than scientific realism.  A few weaknesses are that scientists seem to assume the realist view of the world in their “un-thinking” moments.  The instrumentalist should be able to draw a clear cut distinction between what is and what is not observable, which creates limitations on what really is observable (i.e. naked eye, magnifying glass, microscope, electron microscope, cloud chamber, etc.). This also raises the question, at what point is the objecting being observed really being observed, and so real, but then one bit smaller is not observable and thus not really existent?

Scientific Realism:  Scientific theories are intended to be literally true, and accepting a theory involves believing that it gives a true description of reality, “as it really is.”  A few strengths of this is that it makes the aspect of explanatory power superior to instrumentalism because explanation requires real things that cause the chain of causality.  Explanation by means of fictitious entity is not explanation at all.  Instrumentalism cannot explain the actual success of science, especially science’s making predictions, which are empirically adequate (i.e. Boyles-Charles Law, pv=k).

I’m going to argue that we should adopt the realist position partly because it is common sense and because it means and ends in explanation provide a robust sense of explanatory power that lacks instrumentalism and the metaphysical baggage it may carry is less deleterious than instrumentalism.