- My Evidentialist Epistemology
- Onto-Relationships and Epistemology
- Why Plantinga’s Warrant Cannot Circumvent the Gettier Problem
- A General Rule for Gettier Cases
- Empiricism and Being in the Right Phenomenological Frame of Mind
- Meet Philosopher Linda Zagzebski
- The Connection Between Phenomenology and Existentialism
- A Response to Alvin Plantinga’s “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology”
- Alex Rosenberg on Whether Philosophy Emerges from Science
- Steven Wykstra’s “Toward a Sensible Evidentialism: ‘On the Notion of Needing Evidence.’”
- Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Epistemology
- New Paper: “Epistemological Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs”
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Lewis’ argument from desire posits a certain degree of ignorance as to how the object of desire fulfills that Sehnsucht (literally meaning mind-search, a deep and mysterious longing for something, usually lasting).
- Every natural, innate desire corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire.
- But there exists a desire space, time, or anything can satisfy. This desire is not the difference of degree of natural desire but a different kind.
- Therefore, There must exist something more than these natural [natural], which can satisfy this desire.
He ascribes certain subjective pleasures to an object, which rests at an epistemic distance. There is a concrete/abstract dilemma, which keeps us from knowing a thing completely. We can know about it; we can experience it. Both cannot be done simultaneously and each has its limits when isolated. This epistemic problem, or the lapse in knowledge in illicit pleasure, is due to a separation of the subject from the object. Lewis roots the epistemic dilemmas, the loss of concrete thought, in a long process of separation that begins in the fall.