June 12th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The following is a list of ministries and organizations that I would recommend in helping your pursuit of truth in manners of theology, philosophy, science, ministry, and practical living.
- Alexander Pruss’s Blog: Alexander Pruss is a Christian philosopher at Baylor University who updates his blog with pressing questions and critiques of many ideas.
- Alpha and Omega Ministries: James White’s ministry, which focuses on presuppositional apologetics, reformed theology, Islam, Mormonism, and Roman Catholicism.
- Bio-Complexity: Bio-Complexity is a peer review journal with a specific goal of testing the scientific merit of intelligent design.
- BioLogos Forum: An organization reconciling science with religion. BioLogos is a key proponent of evolution in the TE-ID debate.
- Center for Science and Culture at Discovery Institute: The Discovery Institute is the leading organization on intelligent design pressing issues with the natural sciences and social sciences.
- Christian Classics Ethereal Library: The CCEL is a resource that makes classical writings from early Christian philosophers and theologians available for use.
- Closer to Truth: A website/show devoted to the pursuit of truth asking questions of science, philosophy, and theology presenting views from multiple sides. Here you will find hours of audio/visual resources.
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Posted in Apologetics, Biblical Studies, Christianity, Intelligent Design, Metaphysics, Science | 5 Comments »
June 12th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Question:
This is a follow up question from week 16. For a greater context please see that Q&A.
OK, thank you so much!
I’ll go through your reply point by point more or less, but I’ll try my best to be concise.
On successful research programs – Correct me if I’m wrong, but you seem to assume that science and philosophy aren’t continuous. Perhaps this is based on the idea that science is committed to methodological naturalism (MN). But what do you think of the idea that science isn’t looking for the best naturalistic explanations, but the best explanations, period; and it just so happens that naturalistic explanations have a successful track record and supernatural ones don’t? In other words, MN need not be seen as a presupposition of science, but as sensible advice based on past experience – MN has been tremendously successful before, so why not be committed to it? My point is this: it seems that, unless we assume science and philosophy (qua explanatory practice, at least) are discontinuous, your appeal to God as a metaphysical explanation (as opposed to a scientific one) is questionable.
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Posted in Atheism, Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Q & A, Theology | No Comments »
May 27th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Question:
Hello Max,
I did have a few questions in regards to the nature of scientific explanation and furthering (or ‘advancing’, if you prefer) scientific knowledge. Hume had recognized that the problem of induction can not be justified by an inductive rule (that would be circular) or a deductive rule (or else the principle wouldn’t be inductive – we cannot deduce the truth of induction from the axioms of logic). This of course being Hume’s fork.
However, does Karl Popper’s interpretation of scientific methods being deductive (or falsifiable) solve this problem more so than science on the inductive interpretation? In short, Im just curious if we are reasonable in rejecting Hume’s skepticism, but sound in still adhering to science hinging off of induction.
Answer:
Hi Steven!
I did a lot of work on this question in my MA thesis. My full answer is a bit long but I hope it’s easy to follow. For the Reader’s Digest version, I’d say that I’m not a fan of deductive arguments and I prefer inductive arguments. (Actually, I love abductive arguments much more but that’s another issue!) I’m very sympathetic to Popper’s criterion of falsifiability but it’s not a necessary condition for science–it’s just preferable. I’ll try to contextualize and elaborate on some of the hidden talking points in your question so some of the readers can follow along.
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Posted in Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Science | 2 Comments »
April 30th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The primary difference between realism, constructive empiricism (CE), and anti-realism is where these approaches rest on the spectrum of ontology and explanation. Realism takes theoretical commitments of science to be real, and not just [disguised] abbreviations for observational claims, or useful fictions we create to organize observations.[1] Anti-realism is contrary to realism. Instead of ‘X is an unobservable and X is real’, a la realism, anti-realism purports, ‘X is an unobservable and X is non-real.’ Both schools will recognize that, yes, X is an unobservable but they disagree on the ontic category. The category of ontology becomes muddled, if not superfluous, when referring to unobservable entities. An electron is a useful fiction. Thus, whatever X, if X is commonly referred to what is considered to be an electron, then X is a useful fiction for understanding the consequent state of affairs.
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Posted in Philosophy of Science | No Comments »
April 29th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The anthropic principle takes two primary forms: the weak (WAP) and the strong (SAP). The WAP is a reflective and happenstantial inquiry: The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the universe be old enough for it to have already done so.[1] The SAP is much more problematic: rather than considering just one universe we envisage an ensemble of possible universes—among which the fundamental constants of nature vary. Sentient beings must find themselves to be located in a universe where the constants of nature (in addition to the spatiotemporal location) are congenial.[2]
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Posted in Philosophy of Science, Science | No Comments »
April 28th, 2013
by Max Andrews
For every particle there is a corresponding symmetric particle. Physics has a translational symmetry, which means that the laws and values of physics are the same at every location in the universe. If an observer were to travel from one point to a much farther distant point the observer we see no change in the physics. A broken symmetry introduces change—a non-absolute uniformity. The breaking of symmetries creates complexity in the laws of nature in the outcome of laws. There’s a symmetry and uniformity between the strong and weak nuclear forces, which have been unified as electromagnetism by James Clerk Maxwell. A typical example of vital symmetry breaking is that which gives rise to the balance between matter and antimatter in the early universe. However, there is an asymmetry between the quantum and the large (a la gravity). String theory is the attempt to unify all of physics.
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Posted in Quantum Mechanics, Science | No Comments »
April 27th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The fundamental question raised by these postulates of special relativity is how different coordinate systems (reference frames) are related, i.e., how one transforms between them. (x, y, z, t) denotes the coordinates of some event in frame S, what are the coordinates (x’, y’, z’, t’) in the frame S’ moving at the velocity v relative to S? But first, a clarification on proper time and coordinate time:
Proper time is time measured between events by use of a single clock, where these events occur at the same place as the clock. It depends not only on the events but also on the motion of the clock between the events. An accelerated clock will measure a shorter proper time between two events than a non-accelerated (inertial) clock between the same events.
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Posted in Physics, Science | No Comments »
April 26th, 2013
by Max Andrews
In 1865 James Clerk Maxwell had unified electricity and magnetism by developing his equations of electromagnetism. It was soon realized that these equations supported wave-like solutions in a region free of electrical charges or currents, otherwise known as vacuums. Later experiments identified light as having electromagnetic properties and Maxwell’s equations predicted that light waves should propagate at a finite speed c (about 300,000 km/s). With his Newtonian ideas of absolute space and time firmly entrenched, most physicists thought that this speed was correct only in one special frame, absolute rest, and it was thought that electromagnetic waves were supported by an unseen medium called the ether, which is at rest in this frame.
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Posted in Philosophy of Science, Physics, Science | No Comments »
April 26th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Any type of efficient causality is typically associated with being an unscientific explanation—explanations nonetheless but unscientific. It is believed that if biology, chemistry, physics, etc. rested explanations in final causation then it would be a science stopper. This is where the distinction between Duhemian science and Augustinian science must be made. I would deny the use of Duhemian science. This method, or philosophy, has a goal of stripping science from all metaphysical imports. Augustinian science is open to metaphysical presuppositions with science. Francis Bacon and Descartes used and allowed for formal and final causation in scientific explanation. Newton entered science and postulated that the universe was entirely mechanistic, which was a denial of Baconian and Cartesian science (at least their versions of scientific explanation) but offered no explanation for the appearance of final causation and efficient causation. Darwin came along and provided a plausible material mechanism for the appearance of final and efficient causation (at least for the special science of biology).
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Posted in Darwinism, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science | No Comments »