Posts tagged ‘multiverse scenarios’

June 26th, 2012

The Multiverse, Fine-Tuning, and Nomic Probabilities

by Max Andrews

Whenever probability is being considered there must be some type of relevant or total background information (usually depicted as k).  The immediate objection when applying a probability rule or calculus to the fine-tuning of the universe in a multiverse scenario would be to say that this is universe is not an appropriate random sampling.  In other words, if we know of [at least] only one universe with these values the random sample size is precisely 1; thus, no random sample can be used to assess the probability of certain values of physics in the argument.  In statistics a random sample drawn must have the same chance of being sampled as all the other samples.  Since we know of only one universe we do not know what the range of values for the constants and physics could be.  Additionally, since we don’t know how narrow or broad these ranges could be there’s no way of drawing out any probability based argument for fine-tuning.  However, we can know what other universes would be like if the values were different.  If our natural laws have counterfactuals that are in any way incoherent then this is an appropriate sampling.  Also, to make this objection and advocate that we just so happen to live in a life permitting universe in the multiverse then this objection cannot be made since the claim that we happen to life in a life-permitting one amongst countless others suggest we can know what the other samplings are.

June 25th, 2012

New Paper: “Do Multiverse Scenarios Solve the Problem of Fine-Tuning?”

by Max Andrews

I have a new paper in moderation at arXiv. The two papers below are currently listed there:

  • “Epistemological-Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs,”arXiv: 1205.2896 (May 2012)
  • “Albert Einstein and Scientific Theology,” arXiv: 1205.4278 (May 2012).

Abstract:

The multiverse hypothesis is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning hypothesis. The multiverse dispels many aspects of the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are different initial conditions in each universe, varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature lose their known arbitrary values; thus, making the previous single-universe argument from fine-tuning incredibly weak. There are four options for why a fine-tuning is either unnecessary to invoke or illusory if the multiverse hypothesis is used as an alternative explanans. Fine-tuning might be (1) illusory if life could adapt to very different conditions or if values of constants could compensate each other.