Posts tagged ‘Molinism’

April 18th, 2016

Becoming a Supralapsarian Molinist

by Max Andrews

For the last couple years I’ve been back and forth about infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism. In my pursuit to hold to consilient views, I’m starting to lean and adopt the supralapsarian position.

From the Latin, supra (prior to, below, before), lapsis, (fall).  A term used to denote the logical moment of God’s election of the saints.  Supralapsarianism if the belief that God chose the elect logically prior to the fall of man.

Supralapsarianism is generally held by Calvinists and a few Molinists.  Supralapsarianism places the moment of divine election logically prior to the fall of Adam as opposed to logically posterior to the fall, which is known as infralapsarianism. When God chose the elect he did so without viewing them or considering them in their fallen state.  God chose them in a pre-fallen state.  This position can create controversy and may have unsavory implications.  

March 2nd, 2016

Quantum Indeterminism in a Theistic Universe (Seminar Paper)

by Max Andrews

This May (26-27) I will be presenting a paper titled “Quantum Indeterminism in a Theistic Universe” at the Glasgow Philosophy of Religion Seminar at the University of Glasgow in Scotland.

I’m certainly looking forward to this paper. Since I work with the Many Worlds Interpretation, which is deterministic, this will reflect my research concerning ontological indeterminism (contrasting the determinism I typically work with). This will take an element of my doctoral research an integrate it with theological issues such as sovereignty, providence, and divine knowledge.

My abstract is below:

January 26th, 2016

For Jesus so Loved the Multiverse

by Max Andrews

Parallel universesPerhaps the paramount problem for Christians and the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (or even the multiverse simpliciter) is Christological and anthropological in nature. There seems to be a very real aspect of our subjectively experienced day-to-day living—faith and hope. Hope is faith or trust predicated to the future. The problem should become evermore present in that Christian doctrine teaches that faith in the efficacy of Jesus’ atonement is a sufficient and necessary condition for salvation.

MIT physicist Max Tegmark talks about hope in the sense that it’s illusory. He gives the illustration of the birth of his son. He sat there in the hospital hoping that nothing would go wrong and he realized that this was foolish. The idea of hope is a ruse foisted upon us by our subjective human experience. Tegmark goes on to say,

December 11th, 2015

Defending the Existence of an Actual Infinite

by Max Andrews

This past July I presented my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. In brief discussions with others this paper seems a bit controversial since I’m defending the possibility of an actual infinite set of things existing. Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.

November 27th, 2015

Future Truths

by Max Andrews

Sir,

As you are a brilliant supporter of Molinism, I dare send you a question about that doctrine.

I find Molinism quite appealing from a theological point of view, for it reconciles everything in a very elegant manner: freedom, providence, omniscience, etc. But, this marvelous theological solution has a very high philosophical cost (as far as I understand it, of course).

It supposes that God can know the future contingent facts… without any ground to do it!

To know something is to have a justified true belief. Now, there are only two ways to justify a belief about events: either there is a causal relationship (direct or indirect) between the event and one’s mind, or one is able to deduce the realization of the event from the present state of the world (scientific prediction).

But, and that is the problem, according to Molinism, God is supposed to know the future contingent events without predicting them from their causes (which is normal since they are contingent), and without “seeing” them (God doesn’t wait in order to see them, nor cause them, as in Thomistic theory of physical premotion).

Therefore, what is the link between ideas of God about the events and the events themselves? God doesn’t cause the event, and the event doesn’t cause the idea…Whence do these ideas come? I see no solution. The presence of the idea in God seems absolutely inexplicable, absolutely unfounded. Where does the adaequatio rei et intellectus come from in that case? This situation sounds absurd to me. My question is : how can we explain the truth of innate ideas of God about the things that do not exist and are unpredictible from present situation? To say that divine ideas are true “by definition” seems to be a pure assertion…

Thank you for your help!

In Christo,

Frédéric Guillaud (Paris/France)

August 10th, 2015

My E-Books: From Molinism to Existentialism

by Max Andrews

 

I have gathered my four e-books that I’ve published through Amazon in one convenient spot. Although it would be advantageous to set up a proper author’s page with Amazon but I have yet to do that and simply searching ‘Max Andrews’ isn’t sufficient for finding all the literature (unless you type in another keyword or the title).

If you haven’t already, please share and/or buy these books that you or a friend or a family member may be interested in. The profits go towards keeping this site up and running.

  • Screen Shot 2014-08-07 at 11.45.38 PMAn Introduction to Molinism: Scripture, Reason, and All that God has Ordered (The Spread of Molinism Book 1)
    • The task of a Molinist perspective of middle knowledge is to remove the perceived dilemma between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Middle knowledge is the second logical moment of God’s omniscience. There are three logical moments, the first being natural knowledge. With natural knowledge God knows everything that could logically happen. The third moment is God’s free knowledge; God knows all true propositions of the actual world. Middle knowledge lies logically in between these, which affirms that God knows all true counterfactual propositions, or possess hypothetical knowledge of future contingents. The following is an attempt to provide reasonable grounds for affirming divine middle knowledge.

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July 14th, 2015

“Time and Tide Wait for No Choice: A Response to Emily Paul”

by Max Andrews

On the 2 of July I presented my response paper, “Time and Tide Wait for no Choice: A Response to Emily Paul”, at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. There’s no audio of Emily Paul’s reading but below is a link to her paper.

Emily Paul’s paper, ”Can Divine timelessness reconcile libertarian human freedom and divine knowledge of future human actions?”: http://www.tyndalephilosophy.co.uk/PaulEmily.pdf

July 8th, 2015

Paper: Defending the Possibility of an Actually Infinite Universe

by Max Andrews

Cambridge Max Andrews 2015On July 2, I will be presented my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University.

Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.

June 5th, 2015

Explaining Middle Knowledge Without Being Complicated

by Max Andrews

In the beginning, there was God. Just God. No one or nothing else (“prior” to creation). Now, for the sake of taking some of the language down a few notches, let’s suppose God is deliberating between which worlds he wants to create (I deny divine deliberation, but work with me here).

Let's Make a Deal

Behind door number 1 is an option for a world and universe for God to create. Let’s concoct what this world would look like:

WORLD 1

  • Cassidy owns a ginger cat named Basil
  • Hugo won $156,000,000 in the lottery
  • James got a haircut on 09 November 2004
  • Desmond went to prison

May 31st, 2015

Cambridge Paper Preview: Extent of Existents

by Max Andrews

This July I will be presenting my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. Please Consider Helping! I’m almost at the goal for grants and donations to pay 100%. For insight on my response paper to the plenary speak see my earlier post.

So far, in brief discussions with others, this paper seems a bit controversial since I’m defending the possibility of an actual infinite set of things existing. Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.