In the eighteenth century David Hume held that the relation of cause and effect obtains only when one or more laws subsume the related events—that is, cover them as cases or instances of the operation of the law.[1] This method and criticism of causality deprived science of any valid foundation in necessary connections obtaining between actual events and of leaving it with nothing more reliable than habits of mind rooted in association. Hume’s mode of inquiry was one in which questions yield results that are not entirely new, giving rise to knowledge that can only be derived by an inferential process from what was already known. Humean regularities and constant connections cannot be reduced to scientific explanations. If scientific explanation is causal explanation, and causation is law-governed sequence, then it follows that scientific explanations require laws. However, a problem with this (i.e. the ideal gas law: PV=nRT) is that instead of making things clearer, it threatens to involve the analysis of scientific explanation in a thicket of “metaphysical” issues that several philosophers and positivists sought to avoid.[2] Scientific explanation requires a causal explanation, which requires a law-governed explanation.
Natural Law and Scientific Explanation
by Max AndrewsPosted in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Science | 1 Comment »
Q&A 18: The Metaphysics of Time and the Kalam Argument
by Max AndrewsQuestion:
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Posted in Apologetics | 2 Comments »
A Note on the Problem of Divine Action
by Max AndrewsThe Newtonian system depicted a deterministic universe but it was not causally closed. Newtonian mechanics in conjunction with the Laplacian causally closed universe entails problems for divine immanence. Because of Einstein’s relativity the Newtonian and Laplacian models have been abandoned. The present discussion of how God interacts with the world has shifted to quantum mechanics. There are over a dozen interpretations, which mathematically describe the quantum world. Objections from the principle of conservation are moot in an Einsteinian universe because it is not causally closed. Even so, certain quantum interpretations reject the principle of conservation such as the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation. In a theistic context, GRW makes sense of external causes having an ontological link to the physical world without violating conservation.[1]
Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science | 2 Comments »
Liberty University Debate Video
by Max AndrewsA debate between Max Andrews from Liberty University and Dan Linford from Virginia Tech on the topic “Does God Exist?”
Filmed on the campus of Liberty University, March 28, 2013.
Sponsored by the Liberty University chapter of Ratio Christi, the Phi Sigma Tau Honor Society, and the Philosophy Department of Liberty University.
Posted in Apologetics, Arguments for the Existence of God, Liberty University | No Comments »
Q&A 14: Why Don’t the Laws of Nature Evolve?
by Max AndrewsQuestion:
Hey, Max.
I’ve just started reading Rupert Sheldrake’s The Science Delusion: Freeing The Spirit Of Enquiry and came across three questions about the laws of nature.
In Chapter 3, Sheldrake begins by saying:“Most scientists take it for granted that the laws of nature are fixed.”He then leads on to this question:“If everything else evolves, why don’t the laws of nature evolve along with nature?”The argument that he advances in the chapter involves something he calls ‘habits’, which are “a kind of memory inherent in nature”. (From what I understand, he has also advanced this within a theory of ‘morphic resonance’ in his other published works.) Putting aside his case for these ‘habits’, three questions that he poses to materialists at the end of the chapter caught my eye:1) If the laws of nature existed before the Big Bang, and governed the Big Bang from its first instant, where were they?2) If the laws and constants of nature all came into being at the moment of the Big Bang, how does the universe remember them? Where are they ‘imprinted’?3) How do you know that the laws of nature are fixed and not evolutionary?Although I can hear the materialists cry that these questions are not even wrong, I wondered what you thought about them.Best Wishes,Mark Hawker (UK)read more »
Posted in Cosmology, Philosophy of Science | No Comments »
Q&A 13: Materialism and the Philosophy of Mind
by Max AndrewsQuestion:
I often here materialists argue that minds are the products of brains. I also have heard some argue that minds are non physical. However, I was recently approached with a challenge to materialism on YouTube (specifically this video by a user named OntoLogistics youtube.com/watch?v=sIr22Puh1Wk) where he argued a transcendent mind and argued that materialism is faith based and is based on minimal evidence. I have never heard any clear objections to materialism however a few questions (I am not materialist myself by the way):1. Is mind Non Physical?2. Does the mind transcend the brain?3. Is materialism verifiable/valid?4. Does the soul exist?5. your thoughts on mind/body dualismSam
Answer:
Sam,
Thanks for sending me your question and the material you’ve included. Before I respond to the arguments presented by OntoLogistics I’ll give you a brief response to your five questions and then I’ll elaborate on them.
- Is the mind non-physical? -Yes
- Does the mind transcend the brain? -Yes
- Is materialism verifiable/valid? -Maybe
- Does the soul exist? -Yes
- [My] thoughts on mind/body dualism: I consider myself to be a Cartesian dualist.
read more »
Posted in Metaphysics, Philosophy | 2 Comments »
Q&A 11: Is the Belief in Free Will a Properly Basic Belief? Defeaters?
by Max AndrewsQuestion:
Is the properly basic belief that I have free will indefeasible? I’m thinking of the fact that a properly basic belief can be defeated but was wondering how far that goes. So can someone ever provide a defeater for the idea that we have free will. The thought came to me again when I was listening to a podcast by Glenn Andrew Peoples and he made a comment about how we should give up the idea of free will if a good enough theory (of mind) came along that denied free will. I disagree with Glenn on this but was wondering if you ever could be presented with defeaters for free will. I can sort of see an undercutting defeater might but not a rebutting defeater.
Answer:
John,
For those who may not be familiar with the issue, a properly basic belief is a belief that is held via non-doxastic justification, which is self-evident to the subject. For example, a properly basic belief is the belief that I am a mind or that there is an external reality beyond myself. The first question is whether or not free will is a properly basic belief–and I think not.
Posted in Epistemology, Free Will, Philosophy | 1 Comment »
The Thomistic Doctrine of Creatio Continuans
by Max AndrewsTraditionally, there are two models for how God preserves the existence of the universe. The first is creatio originans (originating creation), which suggests that there has been one initial act of creation and God conserves that reality through a temporal duration. Consider the following definition.
D1. God conserves e if and only if God acts upon e to bring about e’s enduring from t until some t* > t through every subinterval of the interval t –> t*.[1]
Thomas Aquinas de-temporalizes creatio ex nihilo.[2] Thus, Thomas is not very concerned with divine conservation as described above since he does not offer a tensed version of creation nor does he differentiate between conservation and creation.[3] Thomas’ model of creatio continuans (continual creation) can therefore be depicted as:
D2. God continuously creates x = def. x is a persistent thing, and, for all t, if x exists at t, then at t God creates x.[4]
Thomas certainly seems to make a commitment to creatio continuans given his doctrine of simplicity (since timeless follows). However, Thomas tries to have the best of both doctrines by suggesting that God acts within creation and creation was within time yet, in turn, adopt a model of timelessness. Thomas argues that the creation of things was in the beginning of time. For Genesis 1 to include, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” suggests that beginning connotes time.[5]
Posted in Cosmology, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Theology | No Comments »
The Less-Than-Best Problem and Modal Realism
by Max AndrewsGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz developed a similar idea to Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety, which is known as the principle of plenitude. He argues that there must be diversity in that which changes.[1] This change and diversity is what produces the specification and variety of simple substances. This diversity must involve a multitude in the unity or in the simple. For, since all natural change is produced by degrees, something changes and something remains. As a result, there must be a plurality of properties and relations.[2] The principle of plenitude entails absolutely every way that a world could be is a way that some world is and absolutely every way that a part of a world could be is a way that some part of some world is.[3]
The principle of plenitude has been used to argue against modal realism. The principle is supposed to ensure that there are no gaps in logical space. There is some real concrete universe for every way a world could be. This entails that there may be a plurality of worlds that are on balance more bad than good. Theistic modal realism entails that each possible world is a real concrete universe that a perfect being has actualized. In the Leibnizian tradition, the principle entails at least some of the worlds are so bad that no perfect being could actualize them.[4] Hence, Leibniz committed to this world being the best of all possible worlds.[5] This is called the less-than-best problem.
Posted in Metaphysics, Multiverse | 1 Comment »
The Doctrine of Variety and the Multiverse
by Max AndrewsThomas Aquinas believed that there was an appropriated assimilation or likeness to God found in creatures and creation. Some likeness must be found between an effect and its cause. It is in the nature of any agent to do something like itself. Thus, God also gives to creatures and creation all their perfections; and thereby he has with all creatures a likeness.[1]
Additionally, the cause of variety and the multitude of things in creation find their cause in God. Thomas contrasts himself with early Greek philosophers such as Democritus and the other atomists who argued that the distinction of things come from chance according to the movement of matter. Thomas follows Anaxagoras in attributing the multitude to matter and to the agent involved. Thomas identifies this agency as God since he is the creator of matter and thus the efficient cause behind the existence of the matter. Additionally, the universality of things and the perfection of the universe must precede forth from the intention of the first agent—God.[2] Thomas states that the distinction and variety reflects the divine goodness.
For he brought things into being in order that his goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because his goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, he produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.[3]
Posted in Christianity, Metaphysics, Multiverse | 2 Comments »