A Review of William Lane Craig’s “J. Howard Sobel on the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006): 565-584.
William Lane Craig formulates retort to J. Howard Sobel’s objection to kalam as he typically formulates it. Premise 1 seems obviously true—at least, more than its negation. To suggest that things could just pop into being uncaused out of nothing is to quit doing serious metaphysics and is a premise that Sobel acknowledges to be true. Sobel’s objection is with 2—that the universe began to exist. This would then run into an infinite regress, which is philosophically and mathematically untenable. Because an actually infinite number of things cannot exist, the series of past events must be finite in number and, hence, the temporal series of past, physical events is not without beginning.