I have gathered my four e-books that I’ve published through Amazon in one convenient spot. Although it would be advantageous to set up a proper author’s page with Amazon but I have yet to do that and simply searching ‘Max Andrews’ isn’t sufficient for finding all the literature (unless you type in another keyword or the title).
If you haven’t already, please share and/or buy these books that you or a friend or a family member may be interested in. The profits go towards keeping this site up and running.
The task of a Molinist perspective of middle knowledge is to remove the perceived dilemma between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Middle knowledge is the second logical moment of God’s omniscience. There are three logical moments, the first being natural knowledge. With natural knowledge God knows everything that could logically happen. The third moment is God’s free knowledge; God knows all true propositions of the actual world. Middle knowledge lies logically in between these, which affirms that God knows all true counterfactual propositions, or possess hypothetical knowledge of future contingents. The following is an attempt to provide reasonable grounds for affirming divine middle knowledge.
Dave Beck and I have had another paper accepted for this year’s Evangelical Philosophical Society’s annual conference. This year the conference is in Atlanta so I may try to attend it this year but if I’m unable to (contingent on funds and teaching schedule) Dave will be presenting the paper on behalf of both of us.
Date: November 18 at 9:20am
All of my [and our] previous papers have been concerning, primarily, the philosophy of science with the philosophy of religion in tow. Ethics is a new area of professional research for me but the paper will focus on both the ethics/metaethics of the argument and the logic and rationale.
Here’s the abstract to our paper “The Internal Logic of the Moral Argument”:
All of the theistic arguments have the following logical pattern: (1) identify a particular in need of explanation. (2) Eliminate all natural explanations. (3) Conclude to a non-natural alternative. The uniqueness of the Moral Argument, as an attempt to explain moral obligation, is that the non-natural alternative only emerges in the course of the argument and in two phases: (a) A best explanation phase in which neither natural/causal nor the human/free model works. (b) This, in turn, sets up the following dilemma: a fitting explanation must be personal (not causal) but it cannot be other persons because all persons are free and equal in relation to moral obligation. This forces the abduction to the conclusion that there must be a superperson somehow authorized to obligate persons.
The logic of the argument itself forces us to an inference to the best explanation that avoids the aforementioned dilemma: another person, but who is authorized to legislate ethics. In defending our argument we will construct a clear abductive argument, which factors in the set of all explananda. The explanans that we will infer to is a morally capable person and what is of paramount note is that this explanation does not take us fully to the Anselmian God. That is a task for further arguments and sub-arguments.
November 19-21 was this year’s annual Evangelical Philosophical Society’s conference. I coauthored a paper with Dave Beck of Liberty University. This is the third year in a row I’ve had a paper accepted for presentation at EPS.
Abstract: Due to advances in cosmology and theoretical physics the origin of the universe is being relentlessly debated. Nevertheless, whether there is one universe or even an infinite plurality of universes, Thomas Aquinas’ argument for the existence of a first cause from contingency circumvents the debate of temporal beginnings to the universe; such as those that are embedded within the kalam cosmological argument. Tensed, tenseless, dynamic, static, endurantist, and perdurantist theories of time will be irrelevant or be peripheral at best. Physical science as a system will always require further explanation, not mere description, and that explanation will always have to appeal to something outside of itself. This is true for any philosophical and/or theological explanation of science. In this paper we will attempt a consilience of Thomas’ argument from contingency and modern cosmology to show that regardless of whether the universe had a temporal beginning, or what the nature of that beginning might have been, it would still be best explained by a first uncaused cause. We will defend Thomas’ notion of radical contingency and argue against a necessitation understanding of Thomas that is often misattributed to him. This metaphysic will be used as a plausible and defensible abductive cosmological argument, which will appeal to the radical contingency of constituents of the universe, and thus take the form of an argument to the best explanation.
Contemporary physics seem to indicate that there are good reasons, theoretically and physically, for an idea that there is a plurality of worlds. This concept has come to be understood as the multiverse. The multiverse is not monolithic but it is modeled after the contemporary understanding of an inflationary model of the beginning of this universe. Max Tegmark has championed the most prominent versions of the multiverse. Tegmark has made a four-way distinction.
The English poet John Milton did well when he said that “Truth will rise to the top through a free and open exchange in the marketplace of ideas.” I am so encouraged when I have and see a substantive dialogue with someone concerning an issue. This is certainly important in every day discussions, blogs, and teaching. I assist in managing and teaching an Intro. to Philosophy course at university and I always encourage my students to make us work hard to convince them of what we believe to be true. Do not simply sit there and take what I say and teach prima facie–challenge me, challenge the thoughts, challenge your thinking.
Dave Beck and I have had another paper accepted for this year’s Evangelical Philosophical Society’s annual conference. I won’t be at the conference due to my PhD work in Edinburgh, Scotland so Dave Beck will be presenting it on behalf of the both of us. My primary contribution for the paper will be on Thomas and Aristotle’s science and an abductive contingency argument that I’ve tested out in two debates now. The argument will now have its chance to go before the philosophical community. Here’s the abstract:
David Beck and I recently presented a paper on God and the multiverse at the annual Evangelical Philosophical Society conference in Milwaukee, WI on November 14, 2012. In this paper we argue that if a multiverse exists then it is harmonious with theism. Not only do we argue that it’s compatible with theism but we develop a distinctly Christian approach to it. We trace the idea of many worlds back to the pre-Socratics, which contributed to a theistic framework. We use Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and others to create a Christian model of modal realism. We have called our model “Thomistic Modal Realism.” We plan on explicating the paper and submitting it for publication soon. Please feel free to comment and leave feedback in the comment section. Any and all appropriate/substantive feedback will help us strengthen our model.
Tomorrow morning Leah and I will be flying out to Milwaukee, WI for the annual Evangelical Philosophical Society conference at the Hyatt Regency. I have coauthored a paper with Dave Beck titled “God and the Multiverse.” In it we develop a new model of modal realism, what we call Thomistic Modal Realism. Below is the abstract of our paper.
Wednesday 14 Nov.
10.10—10.50 (Hyatt Executive B)
W. David Beck
Max L. E. Andrews
(Liberty University) God and the Multiverse
Recent developments in quantum physics postulate the existence of some form of multiverse. We will argue that a cosmology of many worlds is not novel either to philosophy or to theism. The multiverse is not a monolithic concept and we will refer to and use the four levels of categorization proposed by Max Tegmark. We will trace the idea of a multiverse back to the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle in order to initially demonstrate its fit with a concept of God.
I have gathered together all my posts relevant to the multiverse. Since this is one of the biggest topics on the blog, I thought having all the posts gathered into one place would make finding the content much easier.
This November (Wednesday 14 – Friday 16) The Evangelical Philosophical Society is hosting its annual meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The conference theme is ‘Caring for Creation.’ David Beck and I have coauthored a paper together titled, “God and the Multiverse,” which has been accepted to be presented at the conference. We requested to present on Friday but we’ll get that figured out in due time. You can read the abstract of the paper below. I hope you’re able to make it to the conference.
Recent developments in quantum physics postulate the existence of some form of multiverse. We will argue that a cosmology of many worlds is not novel either to philosophy or to theism. The multiverse is not a monolithic concept and we will refer to and use the four levels of categorization proposed by Max Tegmark. We will trace the idea of a multiverse back to the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle in order to initially demonstrate its fit with a concept of God. We then examine the argument for possible compatibility based on a principle of plenitude in three specifically Christian theists: Origen, Thomas Aquinas, and G. W. Leibniz. We conclude that this argument is sustainable so that if any level of the multiverse actually exists then it is harmonious with theism.