(I’d like to note that someone who is actually making this objection is quite removed from the field of the philosophy of religion.)
Today, we look back on the ancients and ridicule them for thinking that volcanic eruptions were the result of the will of the gods. We now know the geological structure of the planet and how tectonic activity functions and tends to behave in certain areas and layers of the earth. We can see the effect of the volcano’s eruption and extrapolate the causes to the movement of the iron core of the earth. Our scientific knowledge in the field of geology and volcanology have progressed since the ancients. So, has our scientific knowledge of the universe, of all that there is, progressed to the point that we can explain all that there is without having to invoke an uncaused causal agency? First, before one proceeds with any scientific account for an explanation, one must notice the metaphysical aspect of the question. This question is a philosophical question, not a scientific question. Can we extrapolate all causes to have the first cause be self-caused? Using something within the system of “all that there is” to explain the system itself (“all that there is”) is circular. The whole notion is self-defeating.
The following argument is an abductive Thomistic cosmological argument from contingency, which I presented at my recent Ratio Christi debate.
There are contingent constituents to the universe.
Given the contingent constituents of the universe, the existence of the universe (U) is very, very unlikely under the hypothesis that these constituents are themselves uncaused or self-caused (~Cu): that is, P(U|~Cu & k) ≪ 1.
Given the contingent constituents of the universe, the existence of the universe is not unlikely under the hypothesis of a first uncaused cause (Cu): that is, ~P(U|Cu & k) ≪ 1.
Therefore, U strongly supports Cu over ~Cu.
The constituents of the universe include galaxies, planets, stars, cars, humans, leptons, bosons, and other particles. For the constituents of the universe to be uncaused that would mean it is metaphysically necessary. For something to be metaphysically necessary that means that it could not have failed to exist—it exists in every possible world.
For something to be self-caused it must be simultaneously antecedent to itself to produce itself as its own effect. But this contradictory. This would be akin to the ultimate bootstrapping trick.
1)I have a question relating to parsimony and explanatory power.
Let’s say for the sake of argument that God used natural processes entirely to create, us, the cosmos and everything in it. Furthermore science has already discovered all this and there are no giant gaps like abiogenesis.
If we ignore cosmological arguments (let’s say we just aren’t able to formulate one successfully) and consider only teleological and axiological arguments for God’s existence.
Even with these arguments a metaphysical naturalist would be able to show that the appearance of design and morality can be accounted for by natural processes. (again perhaps there is a naturalistic alternative to fine tuning)
A theist might believe that there is design and morality as a part of reality but the naturalist has a complete worldview by explaining these away and plus it appears to be more parsimonious.
On 8 November 2012 I did a presentation to the Ratio Christi club at Liberty University on how to argue for the existence of God. It was designed to be a smaller training session for the Ratio Christi members. I discussed the importance of apologetics and the difference between knowing your faith to be true and showing your faith to be true. That was the followed by methodological differences and my use of the classical approach.
I then gave three arguments: 1) Thomas’ cosmological argument from contingency, 2) the abductive fine-tuning argument, and 3) the abductive moral argument (or as I like to say, the new moral argument).
I guess since I requested the Q&A section, I’ll start it off!
I recently had a conversation with an atheist in which I walked him through the Kalam Cosmological Argument. This inevitably led into a conversation about what criteria a “first cause” must meet. It was difficult for me to explain, and for him to understand how God exists as a necessary being, or out of His own nature.
The atheist resorted to a version of ”Flying Spaghetti Monster” argumentation, in which he said, “How do we know that the first cause wasn’t a giant pink unicorn, or that two universes didn’t just mate and form ours?”. For obvious reasons, his argument is absurd. But what’s the best way to explain the concept of the first cause, and why it couldn’t be a “giant pink unicorn”?
Thanks a lot,
Richie Worrell (USA)
Richie,
I’m always amazed at some of the philosophical lunacy some atheists come up with. The mockery of using phrases like “flying spaghetti monster” or a “giant pink unicorn” weren’t originally developed in response to the kalam. They were developed in response to intelligent design suggesting the designer could be a spaghetti monster. I recall Dawkins using it several times and it has gained popularity in response to the ontological argument.
Nonetheless, let’s accept his flying pasta, pink unicorn, and sexual universes for the sake of discussion. Let’s recap the the kalam argument:
Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
I recently wrote a paper for my course on the philosophy of physics. I decided to title my research, “The Metaphysical Consistency of Applying Daniel Dennett’s Ultimate Bootstrapping to Post Big Bang Scenarios.” Believe me, I devoted a long time towards this paper. I think I succeeded in my task. Although, maybe if I worked on it longer it would have been different. Nonetheless, I believe I’ve demonstrated the metaphysical consistency of Dennett’s bootstrapping. Please download the paper in the link below. (You may need to click it a second time.)
Hume asks the question of how a finite effect can have an infinite cause. Kant says that you can base it on the moral argument. If you are explaining the subsets, you have the explanation of the infinite set (according to Hume). However, in explaining the first member of a finite set, one must go out of that set. Focus on a series in which a member’s existence is explained by the preceding cause. In explaining a set you go outside of the set. The point is not if it’s an infinite set but if it gets outside of the set (relies on PSRb in a way–that there must be some sufficient reasons for any positive fact and denies brute facts.)
Hume also argues against the CA on a priori grounds. He formulates the CA in a way that combines causal (Thomistic or kalam) and reason (Leibnizian). He considers the causal closure of the universe. Under his idea of how the universe is he considers it to be a causally closed system, which, by definition, rules out any external causation. Any a priori argument is absurd to Hume—it’s impossible to deduce the existence of God from fixed necessary premises or Kantian/Newtonian spacetime intuitions.
Hume asks the question of how a finite effect can have an infinite cause. Kant says that you can base it on the moral argument. If you are explaining the subsets, you have the explanation of the infinite set (according to Hume). However, in explaining the first member of a finite set, one must go out of that set. Focus on a series in which a member’s existence is explained by the preceding cause. In explaining a set you go outside of the set. The point is not if it’s an infinite set but if it gets outside of the set (relies on PSRb in a way–that there must be some sufficient reasons for any positive fact and denies brute facts.)