__________

The field of interaction between science and religion is quite vast and in this blog entry I will concentrate on a couple of issues that concern the impact science has had on Abrahamic monotheism/Christianity.

For many people who were raised as a Christian and then went on to study Science at University the religion they had once believed with childlike certainty seems to have been totally and utterly falsified. For them believing in Christianity has become completely unthinkable. But what exactly has been falsified, God’s existence, a Divine genesis, or perhaps the Incarnation and Resurrection of Christ? I would like to propose the hypothesis that the Christianity that has been falsified for many of these people is what I’ll refer to as “Flannelgraph Christianity”.

But what is this Flannelgraph Christianty (FC), where did it come from and what about it is in conflict with science. Most every child that attended Sunday school in the Western World would be familiar with bible stories that were brought to life by the teacher using colourful felt figures which were placed on a felt canvas. This is Flannelgraph and it has proven to be very popular tool for educating young Christians about Christianity. Now I am not trying to make the bizarre assertion that Sunday school classes are at the heart of the conflict between Christianity and Science. But the concept of creating a concrete narrative for every part of the Bible has proven to be detrimental for Christianity. This is especially true for the creation narrative described in Genesis where it seems that only a listeralistic interpretation will do. A quick skim through the history books will show that this treatment of Genesis is something of a recent phenomenon with early Christians such as St Augustine warning against any imperative to take the Genesis narrative literalistically[1].

For many people, both inside the church and out, these concrete narratives seem to either be the main tenants of Christianity or at least are essential to it. In reality while there are many aspect of the Bible that should be defended as a literalistic account of events there are very few of these events that would be critical to the truth of Christianity. Christianity could be reduced down to a small set of literalistic truth claims regarding the incarnation, death and bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ.

While the concept of falsification /verification should never be considered synonymous with truth it seems that Christians should stand firm on the idea that the Resurrection was literal and that Christianity stands and falls with it. Upon the falsification of a literal resurrection to then redefine the Resurrection as being a “spiritual” resurrection would be to commit an ad-hoc fallacy. At that point traditional Christianity would have been falsified and have been replaced with a Neo-Christian belief.

The issue of whether there is conflict between science and the truth claim of the Resurrection is essentially the same as the issue of whether science will allow for the existence of miracles. The issue of science and miracles may be addressed in a future post.

[1] Saint Augustine: The Literal Meaning of Genesis (De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim)

Theology Thursday is a new feature on the blog, which gives a brief introduction to a theological person of significance.

Theologian: William Hasker (Contemporary)

General summary of his theology: Hasker is an open theist and has focused his research in two major areas: omniscience and the mind-body problem.  In this post I’m only going to focus on the latter.  Whatever theory we adopt about mind and body, and their interaction, there is still mystery (whether it be physical, immaterial, or a combination of the sort). The issue of one of transcendence:  how can an embodied being such as humans, transcend their physicality and have mind-like awareness of oneself (when the body is not a mind)?  Hasker says it is not enough to choose theory M (say, materialism) over D (say, dualism) simply by showing that dualism has seemingly insurmountable problems. One should take the speck out of one’s eye first:  one must examine objections to M, too, for these may be even more severe than those against D.  A healthy reminder that having reasons against ~p is not the same as having reasons in favor of p.  [Epistemic principle here:  just because P and Q are logically not co-possible; and you have (non-decisive) evidence against P; it doesn’t follow that you have (decisive, or even non-decisive, perhaps) evidence for Q (cf. Islam and Buddhism, say)].

He makes a distinction between the two properties.  Physical properties:  a property or attribute which can characterize an ordinary physical object, whether or not that object is thought of as being alive or as being possessed of mind, awareness or consciousness.  Mental properties:  a property or attribute which can only characterize an entity which is possessed of some kind of consciousness or awareness  So, the mind-body problem:  how are we best, or at all, able to explain the fact [which seems undeniably true] that human beings have both physical and mental properties?  Hasker adopts a model called emergentism.  Emergentism suggests that the mind results from the aggregate brain activity. The mind is produced by the human brain and is not a separate element added to the brain from outside, which agrees with materialism. The mind is distinct from the brain and its activities are not completely explainable in terms of brain function, which agrees with dualism.

A critique of Hasker’s position: Hasker’s position is a very interesting one.  Whenever I lecture on the mind-body problem I have difficulty critiquing it.  I’m a bit of a Cartesian dualist.  I believe that we are primarily an immaterial mind and we occupy a body.  This is certainly more idealistic than physicalism.  To give a comparison, my position is halfway to one pole on the spectrum while Hasker is halfway on the other side of the spectrum.  I find this view quite attractive to be honest.  My main point of attraction is the scientific aspect persuading my philosophy–a sort of quantum consciousness.  My primary objection is theological.  I am a Cartesian because of how I understand the future resurrection.  I wouldn’t necessarily discourage this view and I believe it’s certainly a viable option.

I would argue that a multi-layered middle knowledge approach is sufficient to answer the question.  I’m approaching this as a Molinist so if you need a refresher on middle knowledge please read Middle Knowledge in a Nutshell.  By introducing a second logical moment in to God’s knowledge, knowledge of the subjunctive conditionals or would-counterfactual knowledge, it is the case that petitionary prayer actually makes a difference.  In God’s middle knowledge there rests two additional layers: the first layer being reaction and the second layer being action. The first layer is God’s progressive apprehension of the truth-value of all would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as they unfold in the logical sequence coupled with his original reactions to these counterfactuals.  The second layer is God’s transformation of each practicable world into a feasible world by fine-tuning it according to his full knowledge of everything that could or would happen in the entire history of that world as a result of different divine responses to creaturely choices.

For an example consider Exodus 32.9-14.

The Lord said to Moses, “ I have seen this people and behold, they are an obstinate people. ¹⁰Now then let Me alone, that My anger may burn against them and that I may destroy them; and I will make of you a great nation.” ¹¹Then Moses entreated the Lord his God, and said, “ O Lord, why does Your anger burn against Your people whom You have brought out from the Land of Egypt with great power and with a mighty hand? ¹²Why should the Egyptians speak, saying, ‘With evil intent He brought them about to kill them in the mountains and to destroy them in the from the face of the earth’? Turn from Your burning anger and change Your mind about doing harm to Your people. ¹³Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, Your servants to whom You swore by Yourself, and said to them, ‘I will multiply your descendants, and they shall inherit it forever.’” ¹⁴So the Lord changed His mind about the harm which He said He would do to His people. (Ex. 32.9-14 NASB)

God’s original reaction, only having apprehended the truth of the circumstances logically leading up to this, was to literally destroy the Israelites and make a new nation from Moses to uphold his covenant with Abraham.  Upon apprehending the logically successive knowledge that Moses, if apprised of this reaction, would implore God to spare the Israelites, God’s mind, or planned reaction, literally changed to a new course of action which left the Israelites intact.[2]

Does this effect or change God’s ontology? No.  This preserves divine perfection.  This approach isn’t as controversial as you may think (regarding divine perfection) because these logical moments are known logically prior to the creative decree.  Not only does this preserve divine perfection but it also preserves the veracity of biblical statements regarding God’s cognitive discourse without diluting the reality of the relationship in prayer and God’s sovereign control of history.

__________

Stephen Law has suggested that arguments such as the cosmological and teleological arguments could serve equally well to support an evil god hypothesis.

He says:

“The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god.”1

This reminds me of the evil demon in Descartes’ Meditations. However, whereas Descartes was introducing the evil demon hypothesis for epistemological reasons Law is raising the evil god hypothesis as a challenge to theism. His challenge is for theological reasons.

Some responses to Law have failed to grasp his argument or have suggested Law’s argument fails to challenge Christian theism (eg. Edward Feser). I think that is incorrect and Law’s challenge should be taken seriously just as Descartes took the evil demon seriously. More reasonable responses to Law have appealed to the fact that Christian theism has other arguments in addition which move us toward a specifically Christian God (such as the moral argument). Whilst I think there is some value in such responses I think there is a better approach.

I will argue that the case for Christian theism is far more rational to the evil god hypothesis on the basis of an a priori argument rather than the successive addition of other a posteriori arguments.

As soon as we look at the proposal we find a problem with Law’s challenge. Whereas Christian theists have been very specific with their definition of a good God, Law is quite vague about what the exact nature of this evil god is.

Law states:

“The challenge is to explain why the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-good god should be considered significantly more reasonable than the hypothesis that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and all-evil god.”2

In describing the evil god he continues:

“Rather, imagine that he is maximally evil. His depravity is without limit. His cruelty knows no bounds. There is no other god or gods – just this supremely wicked being. Call this the evil-god hypothesis.”3

So we have the proposal of a “maximally evil” god. Since my attack is going to be an a priori one it is worth noting first that Law has made reference to such possible attacks and he mentions those of Plato and Daniels. He describes the replies as such:

“A rather different argument would be: ‘But by bringing about evil, your evil god thereby aims to satisfy his own desire for evil; and the satisfaction of a desire is an intrinsic good. Thus the idea of a maximally evil god aiming to produce an intrinsic good involves a contradiction.’

This argument also fails. Even if we grant the dubious assumption that the satisfying of any desire – even an evil one – is an intrinsic good, the most we have revealed, here, is another local asymmetry – that, in aiming to maximize evil, evil god would have also to aim to achieve at least one intrinsic good (namely, the satisfaction of his desire to maximize evil). What we have established, perhaps, is that there are certain logical limits on God’s evilness (just as there are also logical limits on His power: He can’t make a stone so heavy that it cannot be lifted). Evil god can still be maximally evil – as evil as it is logically possible to be.

We have not yet established a contradiction in the notion of a maximally evil being. 

There is, in any case, a more general point to be made about arguments attempting to show that an evil god is an impossibility and that the evil-god challenge is thus met. The point is this: even supposing an evil god is, for some reason X, an impossibility, we can still ask the hypothetical question: setting aside the fact that so-and-so establishes that an evil god is an impossibility, how reasonable would it otherwise be to suppose that such an evil being exists? If the answer is ‘highly unreasonable’, i.e. because of the problem of good, then the evil-god challenge can still be run. We can still ask theists to explain why, if they would otherwise reject the evil-god hypothesis as highly unreasonable, do they not take the same view regarding the good-god hypothesis?”4

I do agree with Law that it appears to be a huge assumption to think that the satisfaction of a desire is, to some extent, necessarily some kind of good. Could we ever bring ourselves to say that the satisfaction of the mass-murderer in accomplishing his goals is some kind of good? I seriously doubt it.

For now I want to aim my criticism of evil god not at some dubious assumption and neither do I wish it to be a problem which could be replied to by asserting some evil god who is maximally great in a logically bound sense. I am therefore aiming my criticism at a logically maximally evil god concept. I am going to argue that such a being is logically impossible with the fact of our existence per se.

As I noted earlier, since Law is ambiguous about the specific attributes of evil god, one has to think he means a god with the completely opposing attributes to the broadly traditional monotheistic God. Therefore such an evil god would be maximally cruel, unjust, selfish etc.

I am going to focus on the quality of being maximally selfish. That is, this evil god is exclusively concerned with itself. Not only is it exclusively concerned with itself but it is exclusively concerned with itself to the logically maximum degree possible. My argument would run as follows.

1. Any maximally logical great being (MLGB) in any possible world would need to have all their characteristics to the logical maximum.

2. An evil MLGB in any possible world would have selfishness to its maximum extent.

3. An evil MLGB in any possible world would not be willing to share anything at all being maximally selfish and completely self-absorbed.

4. An evil MLGB in any possible world would be capable of not creating anything else.

5. An evil MLGB in any possible world would not have the will to create anything due to its supreme selfishness.

6. An evil MLGB in any possible world would not create anything.

However, if the last proposition follows, and logically it appears to, then our very existence appears to contradict the proposal of any logically possible evil god. In fact, I could take 6 further and add that any evil MLGB would not even have the thought of considering the creation of anything else since that would be, even in some small sense, to think of others which would be a good. For an evil MLGB to have a good thought is illogical.

The response to the evil god hypothesis is, therefore, not that it is highly unreasonable that such a being exists but that it is completely unreasonable that such a being should exist. We can now show an evil god to be an illogical concept by adding:

7. Something other than evil god exists.

Not even hyperbolic scepticism will rescue evil god in this case since the type of my existence has no bearing on this criticism (eg. whether I am a brain in a vat or in the Matrix). The doubt employed to rescue evil god would have to doubt that there is even any kind of res cogitans (thinking thing) at all. Unless, that is, the thinking thing is itself the evil god. But if this is so then evil god is no longer maximally great in terms of its omniscience since our own experience contradicts such a notion. Therefore none of us can possibly be evil god.

(Edit: 20 Jan, 2011. 13:40) Another attack might be made upon premise #5. Some might posit that an evil god could create something else for purely evil intentions. The reason for that is to create more opportunities to be evil. However, this premise can be defended against this point by stating that this creation of torture and sadism, whilst consistent with his evilness, is not consistent with his supreme selfishness. We must remember that this evil god is supremely selfish. He has selfishness to the absolutely logically maximum possible degree. This means that such a being could never give any thought whatsoever to anything else – let alone giving existence to any other creature. I am not claiming that creation is, per se, a selfless act and I don’t need to. I only need to show it is incompatible with being maximally selfish. Thus our mere existence remains completely incompatible with the evil god hypothesis.

By contrast, there exist several proposals of a coherently good God made by Christian philosophers and therefore a posteriori arguments for the existence of God can only, logically, be proposed for a good God. There already exist very good, rational grounds for thinking an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God exist through Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument. As Plantinga has stated, the argument is not a proof of God’s existence per se but makes the existence of such a God completely rational. There are also the more traditional responses given by theists to show the attributes of an all-good God are coherent, such as in Richard Swinburne’s ‘The Coherence of Theism’. Certainly, if Law were to reject the coherence of the God of Christianity he would have to demonstrate it himself in order to put his evil god back on par with the Christian God.

Law has already hinted at the direction he would take if it were shown that evil god is completely incoherent. He says:

“The point is this: even supposing an evil god is, for some reason X, an impossibility, we can still ask the hypothetical question: setting aside the fact that so-and-so establishes that an evil god is an impossibility, how reasonable would it otherwise be to suppose that such an evil being exists ? If the answer is ‘highly unreasonable’, i.e. because of the problem of good, then the evil-god challenge can still be run. We can still ask theists to explain why, if they would otherwise reject the evil-god hypothesis as highly unreasonable, do they not take the same view regarding the good-god hypothesis?”5

I reject this is so. As Law himself, among others, has pointed out; the empirical evidence alone is not enough to make such a judgement with any confidence. The good we experience could be part of evil god’s ruse and all the flipped theodicies can work in favour of evil god. In my opinion, there is no powerful empirical evidence against evil god just as there is no powerful empirical evidence against a good God.

Neither can Law appeal to a mysterious evil god hypothesis as he himself has pointed out that such appeals are merely ad hoc.

I hope to have shown that I take the evil god challenge seriously, as I think it should. However, since I have given good reasons for thinking evil god is completely illogical and, in addition to that, I reject the empirical experience of good and evil as pointing toward either a good god or an evil one I would suggest I have met the challenge as given by Law.

1. Stephen Law, ‘The Evil-God Challenge’, Religious Studies, (Cambridge University Press 2009), p.1
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.4
4. Ibid., p.19,20
5. Ibid., p.20

Theologian: John B. Cobb

General summary of his theology: This concept of God has him evolving in the world, co-dependent, and God needs us to evolve with him. God is not all-powerful and he cannot necessarily bring out what he wills. God works with us by luring us; to lure the cosmos and us to an ever-greater directedness, novelty, harmony, and fulfillment. God is not omniscient because the future is truly open. This is a facet is similar to the open theist’s concept of omniscience though the open theist typically affirms that omniscience is defined as God knowing everything in so long as it is possible for him to know it. A more modest case would simply be that omniscience is redefined.

God is seen as an actual and everlasting entity who is becoming (evolving) in potential as a being.

• He supplies every entity with it’s initial entity and gives to all beings relevance
• God needs the world as much as the world needs God
• The consequent of the pole (physical or actual pole; contrast to potential or primordial pole), also called nature instead of pole, which receives or prehends, uses and is affected by the concrete entities of the world

Left side

• Potential and not actual (dotted line maybe)
• Eternal objects
• Primordial and mental

Right side

• Consequent or physical pole
• Relates to all actual entities, galaxies, stars, physics, etc.

The Word of the Week is

Definition: When translated from German it literally means “salvation history.”

More about the term: Heilsgeschichte is an organizing principle developed by Oscar Cullman for the various New Testament titles for Jesus. Cullman’s Christology is centered on what Jesus has done in history.

It is a characteristic of New Testament Christology that Christ is connected with the total history of revelation and salvation, beginning with creation. There can be no Heilsgeschichte without Christology; no Christology without a Heilsgeschichte which unfolds in time. Christology is the doctrine of an event, not the doctrine of natures. (Oscar Cullman, The Christology of the New Testament, rev. ed. [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963], 9).

Two ways can be used to interpret this functional Christology:

1. A functional Christology of the New Testament, as opposed to an ontological Christology , is the truly biblical view, but it can be used to construct a more ontological Christology, since ontological concepts are implicit within the functional.
2. It is neither necessary nor desirable to go beyond the functional approach taken by the New Testament. The New Testament Christology is normative for our Christology.

Example of use: When shifting the emphasis against certain heretical views of Christology, the discussion of natures is ultimately a Greek philosophical concern and not a Jewish or biblical concern–the biblical concern is Heilsgeschichte and not metaphysics.

William Lane Craig formulates retort to J. Howard Sobel’s objection to kalam as he typically formulates it.[1] Premise 1 seems obviously true—at least, more than its negation.  To suggest that things could just pop into being uncaused out of nothing is to quit doing serious metaphysics and is a premise that Sobel acknowledges to be true.  Sobel’s objection is with 2—that the universe began to exist.  This would then run into an infinite regress, which is philosophically and mathematically untenable.  Because an actually infinite number of things cannot exist, the series of past events must be finite in number and, hence, the temporal series of past, physical events is not without beginning.[2]

Before getting into the exchange on actual infinites in fieri they seem to focus attention on Thomas’ arguments on contingency.  Sobel seems to want to apply another Cantorian set to his association of numbers.  Sobel seems to confuse Aquinas’ mathematico-metaphysical claim that there are no infinite numbers with some sort of stricture on the use of words. One can re-define “number” to mean “natural number” if desired, and then Thomas would agree that there is no “number” associated with an infinite multitude.[3]

There is a difference between an actual infinite and a concept of indefinite quantity.  A א cannot actually be formed because a series of events, (E), is formed by successive addition.    A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite and therefore, a series of events cannot be actually infinite.  For an actual infinite to be spatiotemporally actual א would be equivalent to any set (E).  To illustrate this absurdity:  א=(E), and א=(E+1), and א=(E-1) would all have to hold the same truth-value and the same actual collection of events, which is completely unintelligible.

What is true is the idea of ∞=E.  Consider an illustration of a line with three points A, B, and C.  A and B are twice as close to each other as C is to B.  No matter how many times the distance between any of these points are divided, it will never come to an absolute end of division.[4]  The distances between the points are indefinite, not infinite.  However, consider A, B, and C as spatiotemporal physical points.  The concept of infinity is still there, but one may actually travel that distance—the distance is not without end.  The idea of an indefinite quantity, ∞, possibly existing does no justice to defeating the argument.  What Sobel needs to do to refute the argument is to prove that א is actually possible.  The philosophical and mathematical evidence suggest that an actual infinite is impossible, thus, the series of causes for the universe had a beginning.

Craig devotes much attention to the philosophical and mathematical ramifications to an actual infinite.  Sobel makes a suggestion that there was initial time prior to the creation of this universe.  To use the conical illustration of space-time, Sobel’s understanding of the initial time would run perpendicular to the present conical plane from the cone’s initial singularity.  The time posited is a metaphysical time.  Craig’s response is that to suggest that a metaphysical time be inclusive with the metaphysical claim that nothing can begin to exist uncaused is still metaphysically inconsistent and Sobel’s positing of such time is not needed and does not really advance his argument.  Craig then proceeds to provide a counterpoint argument based on contemporary cosmology and the big bang standard model.

What is interesting about Sobel’s metaphysical time is that he posits a beginningless series on metaphysical grounds respective to the actual physics.  His argument, if the metaphysical principle Craig responds with stands true, is really self-defeating.  It is interesting to see this posit of metaphysical time rather than the popular geometric time advocated by other objectors to kalam.  Craig harshly criticized Sobel for his radical revisions of contemporary cosmology.

Craig’s summation and responses to Sobel are the same that Craig gives in the rest of his aggregate literature concerning kalam.  He will address the particular objection and tie it back to an initial principle premised in his formulation of the argument.  Sobel’s attempt is similar to the Nowacki-Guminski dialogue concerning Cantorian sets[5] except Sobel applies this to modern cosmology, which flies in the face of the consensus of modern cosmological scholarship.

Mark Nowacki’s article is in response to an ongoing dialogue between himself and Arnold Guminski.  Guminski had recently written critiques of Nowacki’s version of the kalam cosmological argument and Nowacki responds by clarifying misconceptions and elaborating on key premises to the argument.  Nowacki’s argument is based on the impossibility of an actual infinite magnitude [not multitude] with respects to temporal marks.

Nowacki begins by developing an account of modality called substantial modality with respects to substances that obtain in the actual universe.  Substantial possibility is a more restricted domain than logical possibility.  Substantial possibility is the domain of possibility that tracks what is causally open to substances as a function of the particular natures that those substances possess.  Anything that is substantially possible is logically possible, but the converse does not hold:  something maybe logically possible without being substantially possible.[1]  One substantially necessary feature for any physical body is that it possesses a definite shape.

Nowacki invests detailed portions defending his assertion that certain entities, particularly physical entities in the actual world, cannot be infinite.  His example is a hyperlump, a lump of clay composed of an infinite quantity of an aggregate of smaller handfuls of clay.  He states that if a hyperlump is substantially possible then it must have a physical shape.  The problem is that a hyperlump cannot have definite shape.  He uses this as an illustration of the impossibility of an actual infinite and contradictions arise for the hyperlump at the substantial nature.  Nowacki states that it would be false to claim that his version of kalam relies on the systematic application of Cantorian set theory to the world.  It would be important to note that the basic argumentative thrust of his argument is that it is substantially impossible to instantiate an actually infinite magnitude.  Focusing on magnitude helps with explicating the paradoxes associated Hilbert’s Hotel and other thought experiments.

He then introduces his own paradoxical thought experiment involved an infinite set of humans (H) sitting in chairs (C).  Each member of H has a number posted to his or her chest identifying his or her respective chair in the set of C.  If the first member in H were to have a new chair, C₊₁, placed to his right and if the identifying number was moved to the right hand of each member in H there would be an instantiation of a paradox by identifying which member of C H is pointing to with their number.  His thought experiment satisfies the need to falsify Guminski’s response [as its predication Cantorian sets].  The thought experiment is not seminal in its accomplishing feat.  It merely needs to be filed with Hilbert’s Hotel and Craig’s library for its appropriate use and time.

After spending three-quarters of the paper clarifying the metaphysical qualifications for the impossibility of an actual infinite Nowacki commences with his case of applying his argument.  Temporal marks are truth makers for historical claims.  It is a metaphysical feature possessed by a substance that belongs to the substance because of some real causal relation that either the substance itself or one of its precursors enter into during historical existence.[2]  The series of marks is not a physical mark but an indexical of previous causes.  The causal history of an actualization can be traced back to a regress of causes (hence the impossibility of an actual infinite).

Nowacki needed to expound on this more, though he conceded the fact that he did not have enough space to elaborate, because there are unanswered questions that remain.  It may certainly be true that substances would bear temporal marks of previous causal relationships but how would this be indicative of any agent causation.  An extrapolation of temporal marks may indicate an agency as a source to series of causes.  Nowacki may see this being inclusive of agent causation but he did not explicate any clarification.

Comparing Nowacki’s version of kalam to its aggregate literature, Nowacki’s version does not seem to advance the power of William Lane Craig’s version.  That would not be to say that Nowacki’s argument is unconvincing, it is, but it seems to only address the minutia of metaphysical qualms by a minority of objectors.  What is advantageous for this version of the argument is that the argument, by Nowacki’s claim, is still applicable to B-theorists.  The reason for how this is accomplished is not unraveled in this paper, he merely refers to some of his other work, but to refer to these causes as events and event-states may be more convincing to B-theorists once clarified.

In William Lane Craig’s reflections on Graham Oppy’s recent critiques of the cosmological argument[1], particularly kalam, Craig finds his arguments to lack serious considerations of a temporal order of causation and that the metaphysical theorizing of modality and causation are ambiguous and lack rigor.  Oppy’s argument is based on what an “initial state” of the universe is and its essential properties.  His initial state is ambiguous but Craig explicates Oppy later in his critique.

Oppy’s argument is not really against a temporal state as he defines it.  Craig clarifies Oppy’s argument and focuses on Oppy’s real concern; the temporality of the initial state and its cause if such a cause existed.  The proponent of kalam agrees with Thomas and is more than willing to concede the point that there can be an actual infinite of in fieri causes but it is impossible to have an infinite in esse causes.  Just as if one were to pull the last boxcar to the front of the train to make a circle, it would not initiate any causality.  The kalam proponent finds himself affirming that it is impossible for any existing thing, whether occupying an initial state of reality or a later state of reality, to come into being without a cause.  Craig’s counterargument is predicated on objective temporal becoming, an A-theory of time.  The whole concept of kalam requires that time be objectively tensed as opposed to an atemporal reality and where all temporal becoming is illusory, a mere side effect of human consciousness.  Oppy’s argument is metaphysically consistent with a tenseless theory, but he cannot explicate an infinite series of in fieri causes with objective temporal becoming. Craig reformulates Oppy’s argument along tensed lines[2]:

1´. If it is possible for something to come into being without a cause at a first moment of time, then it is possible for things to come into being without a cause at later moments of time.

2´. It is not possible for things to come into being without a cause at later moments of time.

3´. Therefore, it is not possible for something to come into being without a cause at a first moment of time.

Oppy argues that the contingent things that feature in the initial state of reality are the only kinds of things that can have no cause.  Only some sort of fundamental entity as described by a theory of everything or some quantum gravitational model.  Only those entities can come into existence only at a first moment of time and those things which come into being at later times could not come into being at a first moment of time.  The driving force behind the argument is the intuition that there is nothing about temporal moments as such that could make their location relevant to whether something can spring into being at that point without a cause of any sort.

Oppy constructs a metaphysic suggesting that all possible worlds have the same initial state.  This modality is incredibly constrained to the necessity of such an initial state of affairs.  Evidentially, the spin, charge, flavor, and color of a particle are descriptive and not prescriptive.  Popular quantum fluctuation models of the universe’s coming into being necessitate a vacuum of instability and to answer the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” the response is that nothing is unstable or impossible.  The question, then, is what necessitates the vacuum?  If all possible worlds necessarily have the same initial states of affairs then physics must follow this metaphysic.  The initial state of affairs has certain essential properties that later contingent things do not possess.  So Oppy follows suit and recognizes that currently existing entities must have a cause to their coming into existence in time because these entities do not have a

Oppy’s metaphysic is too ad hoc and Craig appropriately critiques Oppy’s metaphysic by questioning why the entities have odd essential properties, which are nothing but arbitrary predications masked as qualities [of the physical world].  Oppy’s argument that the universe’s essential components comprising the initial conditions are essentially uncaused fails to be consistent because it is arbitrary.  Why would things not pop into [or out of] existence at this moment in time?  It seems highly problematic, even falsifiable, given thermodynamics.[3]

Oppy certainly poses an interesting challenge for kalam proponents by introducing a metaphysic of modality.  The problem for Oppy is to provide a stronger foundation for why certain particles have an essential property that begins to exist in time without any previous cause.  The metaphysic is too ad hoc and arbitrary.  The physics needed to follow his metaphysic is problematic as well since the physics are currently viewed as a temporal contingency.[4]