Archive for ‘Philosophy’

February 4th, 2016

Identity in Branching Worlds (Multiverse)

by Max Andrews

In a non-Everettian context (Hugh Everett) identity may be understood in different ways. Consider David Wallace’s example of the ancient pot (P2). An antiquities specialist informs you that your P2 is the same as P1, a famous pot owned by Emperor Tiberius in ad 30. There is a four-dimensional tube P in spacetime extending from P1 toP2—a spacetime worm. The matter of the tube has certain structural and dynamical connections running along it. If we write P(t) for the contents of P indexed at time t, the specialist’s claim is underwritten by the existence of some structural-dynamical relation R holding, for each t, between P(t) and P(t + δt), with δ signifying a difference or change in time. Each indexed moment along P(t) would simply be a stage of the pot’s existence.

There are two basic philosophical conclusions about the identity of the pot being the same pot. The first is called the Worm View as I’ve previously alluded to. Under this view, P is the pot and P1 and P2 are just different names for the pot (literally, P1 = P2). The second view that the P1 and P2 are the same is the Stage View. The pot appears as an instantaneous three-dimensional object: P1 = P(AD 30); P2 = P(AD 2016). Thus, to say that P1 and P2 is the same pot, it means: P2 is linked to P1 by a continuous chain of R-related pots.

January 26th, 2016

For Jesus so Loved the Multiverse

by Max Andrews

Parallel universesPerhaps the paramount problem for Christians and the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (or even the multiverse simpliciter) is Christological and anthropological in nature. There seems to be a very real aspect of our subjectively experienced day-to-day living—faith and hope. Hope is faith or trust predicated to the future. The problem should become evermore present in that Christian doctrine teaches that faith in the efficacy of Jesus’ atonement is a sufficient and necessary condition for salvation.

MIT physicist Max Tegmark talks about hope in the sense that it’s illusory. He gives the illustration of the birth of his son. He sat there in the hospital hoping that nothing would go wrong and he realized that this was foolish. The idea of hope is a ruse foisted upon us by our subjective human experience. Tegmark goes on to say,

December 11th, 2015

Defending the Existence of an Actual Infinite

by Max Andrews

This past July I presented my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. In brief discussions with others this paper seems a bit controversial since I’m defending the possibility of an actual infinite set of things existing. Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.

November 23rd, 2015

Personal and Research Updates

by Max Andrews

Since the site has been down for approximately three months and is slowly getting back up, I’d like to give an update on what has been happening and some changes in the direction of my doctoral research.

Over the last couple years a lot of things have happened but the details will have to remain absent for now. One series of events led to several medical bills from the States needing to be paid. Due to some government policy changes they were moved to the forefront, which required immediate attention and affected much of my financial situation over here. A friend of mine, Alfonso Alvarez created a fundraising page, which completely blew me away.

So many friends and strangers helped me exceed my goal to help with the circumstances. I’m very grateful for everyone who helped. For those who prayed, gave financially, and even gave food, thank you! I’m truly humbled by what happened and it was quite encouraging. To see how a community of like-minded people can come together and help out another person is inspirational. I’ve given ebook copies to all those who helped that wanted them. Some were anonymous and if you’d like to get in touch with me and get your copies, please do.

August 13th, 2015

What is a Scientific Explanation?

by Max Andrews

Scientific Explanation

  • If scientific explanation is causal explanation, and causation is law-governed sequence, then it follows that scientific explanations require laws.  However, a problem with this (i.e. the ideal gas law: PV=nRT) is that instead of making things clearer, it threatens to involve the analysis of scientific explanation in a thicket of “metaphysical” issues that several philosophers and positivists sought to avoid.[1] Scientific explanation requires a causal explanation, which requires a law-governed explanation.
  • Natural law describes but does not explain natural phenomena.
    • Consider the use of D-N: Newton’s law of universal gravitation described, but did not explain, what caused gravitational attraction.  Newton claimed that he invented no hypotheses but deduced them from observations produced by rationalistic positivism, which engulfed contemporary European science.  Even though Newton’s law does not explainthe data, it is still scientific but offers no scientific explanation.  Many scientific theories do not offer an explanation by natural law.  Instead, they postulate past regularities to explain presently observed phenomena, which also, in turn, allow for predictive capabilities
  • Our knowledge of cause and effect relationships, which can sometimes formulate as laws, will often guide the inferences that scientists make about what happened in the past and will influence their assessment of the plausibility of competing explanations.
    read more »

August 10th, 2015

My E-Books: From Molinism to Existentialism

by Max Andrews

 

I have gathered my four e-books that I’ve published through Amazon in one convenient spot. Although it would be advantageous to set up a proper author’s page with Amazon but I have yet to do that and simply searching ‘Max Andrews’ isn’t sufficient for finding all the literature (unless you type in another keyword or the title).

If you haven’t already, please share and/or buy these books that you or a friend or a family member may be interested in. The profits go towards keeping this site up and running.

  • Screen Shot 2014-08-07 at 11.45.38 PMAn Introduction to Molinism: Scripture, Reason, and All that God has Ordered (The Spread of Molinism Book 1)
    • The task of a Molinist perspective of middle knowledge is to remove the perceived dilemma between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. Middle knowledge is the second logical moment of God’s omniscience. There are three logical moments, the first being natural knowledge. With natural knowledge God knows everything that could logically happen. The third moment is God’s free knowledge; God knows all true propositions of the actual world. Middle knowledge lies logically in between these, which affirms that God knows all true counterfactual propositions, or possess hypothetical knowledge of future contingents. The following is an attempt to provide reasonable grounds for affirming divine middle knowledge.

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July 14th, 2015

“Time and Tide Wait for No Choice: A Response to Emily Paul”

by Max Andrews

On the 2 of July I presented my response paper, “Time and Tide Wait for no Choice: A Response to Emily Paul”, at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. There’s no audio of Emily Paul’s reading but below is a link to her paper.

Emily Paul’s paper, ”Can Divine timelessness reconcile libertarian human freedom and divine knowledge of future human actions?”: http://www.tyndalephilosophy.co.uk/PaulEmily.pdf

July 8th, 2015

Paper: Defending the Possibility of an Actually Infinite Universe

by Max Andrews

Cambridge Max Andrews 2015On July 2, I will be presented my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University.

Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.

May 31st, 2015

Cambridge Paper Preview: Extent of Existents

by Max Andrews

This July I will be presenting my first philosophy of mathematics paper at Tyndale’s conference at Cambridge University. Please Consider Helping! I’m almost at the goal for grants and donations to pay 100%. For insight on my response paper to the plenary speak see my earlier post.

So far, in brief discussions with others, this paper seems a bit controversial since I’m defending the possibility of an actual infinite set of things existing. Below is the abstract for “The Extent of Existents: Ontologies and Infinities”.

Abstract: There seems to be an intrinsic rationality to the universe that is not simply extrinsically projected by the knowing subject. The consilience between mathematics and physics is inherent to nature and is inductively depended upon by every person. What makes the question of infinities interesting is whether there actually are such existent sets. Theists are often inclined to deny that actual infinites exist and explain such things as useful fictions of conceptually existent in the mind of God—but there can be no actual infinite set (ℵ) of existents [or anything]. I will, of course, address the concrete or abstract nature and [the so-called] indispensability of such sets but that is a peripheral concern, as the infinite set of quarks or strings does not necessarily depend on the existence of the correlate abstracta. I will then survey some rejoinders such as Hilbert’s Hotel and other ‘incoherence’ arguments against actual infinites and how they are limited in applicable scope. Cantorian and ZFC semantics will be used, as they are mathematically canonical. I will conclude that theists are wholly consistent in their philosophy of mathematics and science, which will, in turn, compose a stronger theology of nature by affirming actual infinites. A theological and scientific consilience will be argued from the Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety and G. W. Leibniz’s principle of plenitude. I will conclude that having a theology and philosophy that permits an actual infinite set of existents will not conflict with [examples in] theoretical physics such as many cosmological models and some mechanics in quantum physics—though this is not to be considered a driving motivator; rather, it’s an example of some of the consequences for one allowing the possibility of an actual infinite of existents to one’s ontological framework.

May 20th, 2015

New EPS 2015 Conference Paper on the Moral Argument

by Max Andrews

column_leftDave Beck and I have had another paper accepted for this year’s Evangelical Philosophical Society’s annual conference. This year the conference is in Atlanta so I may try to attend it this year but if I’m unable to (contingent on funds and teaching schedule) Dave will be presenting the paper on behalf of both of us.

Date: November 18 at 9:20am

All of my [and our] previous papers have been concerning, primarily, the philosophy of science with the philosophy of religion in tow. Ethics is a new area of professional research for me but the paper will focus on both the ethics/metaethics of the argument and the logic and rationale.

Here’s the abstract to our paper “The Internal Logic of the Moral Argument”:

All of the theistic arguments have the following logical pattern: (1) identify a particular in need of explanation. (2) Eliminate all natural explanations. (3) Conclude to a non-natural alternative. The uniqueness of the Moral Argument, as an attempt to explain moral obligation, is that the non-natural alternative only emerges in the course of the argument and in two phases: (a) A best explanation phase in which neither natural/causal nor the human/free model works. (b) This, in turn, sets up the following dilemma: a fitting explanation must be personal (not causal) but it cannot be other persons because all persons are free and equal in relation to moral obligation. This forces the abduction to the conclusion that there must be a superperson somehow authorized to obligate persons.

The logic of the argument itself forces us to an inference to the best explanation that avoids the aforementioned dilemma: another person, but who is authorized to legislate ethics. In defending our argument we will construct a clear abductive argument, which factors in the set of all explananda. The explanans that we will infer to is a morally capable person and what is of paramount note is that this explanation does not take us fully to the Anselmian God. That is a task for further arguments and sub-arguments.