June 17th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Max Tegmark has introduced an anthropic principle specifically related to multiverse scenarios—the minimalistic anthropic principle (MAP). Tegmark believes the anthropic principle has generated more heat than light with so many different interpretations. MAP states that when testing fundamental theories with observational data, ignoring selection effects can give incorrect conclusions.[1]
Tegmark does not use MAP and selection effects to rule out everything. It cannot rule out chaotic inflation by the fact that we find ourselves living in the miniscule fraction of space where inflation has ended, since the inflating part is uninhabitable to us. As pointed out by Ludwig Boltzmann, if the universe were in a classical thermal equilibrium (heat death), thermal fluctuations could still make atoms assemble at random to briefly create a self-aware observer (a Boltzmann brain) like us every once in a blue moon, so the fact that we exist right now does not rule out the heat death cosmological model.[2] So, what should we do with Boltzmann brains?
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Posted in Cosmology, Multiverse, Quantum Mechanics | No Comments »
June 15th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Posted in Multiverse | 2 Comments »
May 29th, 2013
by Max Andrews
My Master’s thesis is now available for download.
Degree: Master of Arts
Chair: W. David Beck
Primary Subject Area: Philosophy; Physics, Astronomy and Astrophysics; Religion, General; Physics, Theory; Physics, General
Keywords: cosmology, fine-tuning, information, multiverse, philosophy of science, quantum
Disciplines: Astrophysics and Astronomy | Cosmology, Relativity, and Gravity | Philosophy | Philosophy of Science | Quantum Physics | Religion
Abstract: The multiverse hypothesis (the view that there is not just one world or universe in existence, bur rather that there are many) is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning hypothesis (the laws of physics and constants are fine-tuned for the existence of life).
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April 26th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The Borde-Vilenkin-Guth Theorem states that any universe, which has, on average, a rate of expansion greater 0 that system had to have a finite beginning. This would apply in any multiverse scenario as well. There are four exceptions to the theorem.*
1. First Exception: Initial Contraction (Havg<0) … (The average rate of the Hubble expansion is less than zero)
- Main Problem: Another problem this raises is that this requires acausal fine-tuning. Any attempt to explain the fine-tuning apart from a fine-tuner is left bereft of any explanation.
2. Second Exception: Asymptotically static (Havg=O)
- Main Problem: The exception is that it does not allow for an expanding or evolutionary universe. This model cannot be true. The best evidence and empirical observations indicate that the universe is not static; rather, it is expanding and evolving. This might have been a great model under Newton but not since Einstein’s field equation concerning the energy-momentum of the universe.
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Posted in Cosmology, Multiverse | 3 Comments »
March 22nd, 2013
by Max Andrews
I’ve been waiting for new Planck data to come in for a while now and I’ve been very excited about this. First we had COBE (Cosmic Background Explorer) that gave us the first images of the cosmic microwave background radiation approximately 380,000 years after the big bang when light became visible. This discovery led George Smoot and John Mather to receive the Nobel Prize in Physics (2006).
COBE data
Then we had the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Prove (WMAP) satellite, which provided a much clearer and more defined resolution revealing a much more precise picture of the early universe.
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February 5th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Max Tegmark, “Parallel Universes,” Scientific American 2003.
The following is the abstract to Don Page’s paper, “A Theological Argument for an Everett Multiverse.”
Science looks for the simplest hypotheses to explain observations. Starting with the simple assumption that {\em the actual world is the best possible world}, I sketch an {\it Optimal Argument for the Existence of God}, that the sufferings in our universe would not be consistent with its being alone the best possible world, but the total world could be the best possible if it includes an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God who experiences great value in creating and knowing a universe with great mathematical elegance, even though such a universe has suffering.
God seems loathe to violate elegant laws of physics that He has chosen to use in His creation, such as Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetism or Einstein’s equations of general relativity for gravity within their classical domains of applicability, even if their violation could greatly reduce human suffering (e.g., from falls). If indeed God is similarly loathe to violate quantum unitarity (though such violations by judicious collapses of the wavefunction could greatly reduce human suffering by always choosing only favorable outcomes), the resulting unitary evolution would lead to an Everett multiverse of `many worlds’, meaning many different quasiclassical histories beyond the quasiclassical history that each of us can observe over his or her lifetime. This is a theological argument for one reason why God might prefer to create a multiverse much broader than what one normally thinks of for a history of the universe.
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Posted in Cosmology, Existence of God, Metaphysics, Multiverse | No Comments »
February 1st, 2013
by Max Andrews
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz developed a similar idea to Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of variety, which is known as the principle of plenitude. He argues that there must be diversity in that which changes.[1] This change and diversity is what produces the specification and variety of simple substances. This diversity must involve a multitude in the unity or in the simple. For, since all natural change is produced by degrees, something changes and something remains. As a result, there must be a plurality of properties and relations.[2] The principle of plenitude entails absolutely every way that a world could be is a way that some world is and absolutely every way that a part of a world could be is a way that some part of some world is.[3]
The principle of plenitude has been used to argue against modal realism. The principle is supposed to ensure that there are no gaps in logical space. There is some real concrete universe for every way a world could be. This entails that there may be a plurality of worlds that are on balance more bad than good. Theistic modal realism entails that each possible world is a real concrete universe that a perfect being has actualized. In the Leibnizian tradition, the principle entails at least some of the worlds are so bad that no perfect being could actualize them.[4] Hence, Leibniz committed to this world being the best of all possible worlds.[5] This is called the less-than-best problem.
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Posted in Metaphysics, Multiverse | 1 Comment »
January 29th, 2013
by Max Andrews
Thomas Aquinas believed that there was an appropriated assimilation or likeness to God found in creatures and creation. Some likeness must be found between an effect and its cause. It is in the nature of any agent to do something like itself. Thus, God also gives to creatures and creation all their perfections; and thereby he has with all creatures a likeness.[1]
Additionally, the cause of variety and the multitude of things in creation find their cause in God. Thomas contrasts himself with early Greek philosophers such as Democritus and the other atomists who argued that the distinction of things come from chance according to the movement of matter. Thomas follows Anaxagoras in attributing the multitude to matter and to the agent involved. Thomas identifies this agency as God since he is the creator of matter and thus the efficient cause behind the existence of the matter. Additionally, the universality of things and the perfection of the universe must precede forth from the intention of the first agent—God.[2] Thomas states that the distinction and variety reflects the divine goodness.
For he brought things into being in order that his goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because his goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, he produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates in the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.[3]
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Posted in Christianity, Metaphysics, Multiverse | 2 Comments »
January 19th, 2013
by Max Andrews
The multiverse hypothesis is the leading alternative to the competing fine-tuning hypothesis. The multiverse dispels many aspects of the fine-tuning argument by suggesting that there are different initial conditions in each universe, varying constants of physics, and the laws of nature lose their known arbitrary values; thus, making the previous single-universe argument from fine-tuning incredibly weak. There are four options for why a fine-tuning is either unnecessary to invoke or illusory if the multiverse hypothesis is used as an alternative explanans. Fine-tuning might be (1) illusory if life could adapt to very different conditions or if values of constants could compensate each other. Additionally, (2) it might be a result of chance or (3) it might be nonexistent because nature could not have been otherwise. With hopes of discovering a fundamental theory of everything all states of affairs in nature may perhaps be tautologous. Finally, (4) it may be a product of cosmic Darwinism, or cosmic natural selection, making the measured values quite likely within a multiverse of many different values. In this paper I contend that multiverse scenarios are insufficient in accounting for the fine-tuning of the laws of nature and that physicists and cosmologists must either accept it as a metaphysical brute fact or seriously entertain the hypothesis of a fine-tuner.
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Posted in Metaphysics, Multiverse, Philosophy of Science | 6 Comments »
This is a compilation of posts, which focus on the philosophy of science. These posts will cover a broad spectrum within the philosophy of science ranging from multiverse scenarios, scientific theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.