Q&A 8: The Logical Coherence of the Trinity

by Max Andrews

Q&A GraphicQuestion:

Max,

Do you know of any viable philosophical-theological conceptualizations of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity which capture the fullness of the doctrine whilst not lapsing into the heresies of either Modalism, Tritheism or, of course, any form of Unitarianism? Thank you for all you do.

- B. P. Burnett.

Answer:

Brendan,

Thanks for your question! I chose this one for this week because I happen to use the Trinity as an example in my philosophy class when teaching logic, which I’m currently teaching. So, this is rather good timing!

To give a recollection for those who may not be familiar with the Orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and important heresies I’ve provided a simple chart:

GROUP

TIME

HUMAN NATURE

DIVINE NATURE

CHURCH COUNCIL

Docetism

1st Century

Denied—only an appearance of humanity

Affirmed

Ebionism

2nd Century

Affirmed

Denied—Jesus was natural son of Joseph and Mary

Arianism

4th Century

Affirmed

Denied—Jesus was not eternal; similar to, but not same as God Condemned by Nicea, 325

Apollinarianism

4th Century

Divine Logos replaced human spirit

Affirmed

Condemned by Constantinople, 680

Nestorianism

5th Century

Christ was two Persons

Condemned by Ephesus, 431

Eutychianism

5th Century

Not fully human

Not fully divine

Condemned by Chalcedon, 451

Christ was a single mixed nature

Orthodoxy

Perfect humanity

Perfect Deity

Defined by Chalcedon, 451

Christ is one Person

Additionally, here’s a diagram to help understand who is who in the Trinity:

Trinity

The objection/problem that is posed against the Trinity is made on the basis of two laws of logic: the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction. The law of identity states that A=A (i.e. the pen is a pen). It’s quite simple. The law of non-contradiction states that two things (propositions) cannot be true at the same time in the same sense (i.e. Mark has homework to do tonight and he does not have any homework to do tonight). What’s important here is the conjunction (‘and’). Homework and tonight are the two terms that have to be explicated but this is a simple example of a contradiction–taking the same proposition (Mark has homework to do tonight) and affirming both the affirmative and the negation. This problem appears in the Trinity when we start throwing around the word ‘is.’

Now, what’s crucial for having a coherent doctrine of the Trinity is knowing what the definition of ‘is’ is. We all make fun of and laugh at Bill Clinton when he famously asked, “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is…” However, Bill Clinton isn’t that stupid. He knew what he was saying–especially since he was a philosophy major. There are four/five definitions for the word ‘is’ (depending on how you want to break it down.)

 

  1. The IS of existence: The universe is.
  2. The IS of predication: (This is where we can have either that fourth or fifth definition.) Essential predication would be “Mark is human” or “Mark is mind.” It makes a commitment to essential properties. Then there is accidental predication, “The chair is red.”
  3. The IS of constitution: The table is wood and nails (the part/whole relationship of the object).
  4. The IS of identity: Mark is Mark.

When understanding the Trinity, we use the ‘is’ of identity when we say, “The Trinity is God.” However, when we say that the father is God, Jesus is God, or the Holy Spirit is God we have to use ‘is’ as the ‘is’ of predication. So, when we say that Jesus is God we are predicating Godness (divinity) to Jesus. As long as we use the word ‘is’ carefully and not use the ‘is’ of identity in a contradicting manner then I think we can have a coherent model of the Trinity.


10 Comments to “Q&A 8: The Logical Coherence of the Trinity”

  1. Max,

    I think these kinds of conceptual distinctions form an essential part of Trinitarian conceptualisation. Of course the classic Unitarian claim is a numerical identification between God (G) and the Father (F) in contrast to Jesus (J), forming this kind of valid argument: (G = F, J ≠ F, thus J ≠ G). Many lay Christians are at the risk of falling prey to this kind of Unitarian identity thesis because of a lack of basic familiarity with the kind of conceptual distinctions you have pointed out above, and most frankly seem on the verge of becoming practical Modalists or Subordinationists when it comes to an understanding of what we mean by “the Father/Son/Holy Spirit is God”, often conflating concepts with respect to the divine persons.

    But I believe this is merely the essential groundwork. Once we have established these kinds of necessary conceptual distinctions about what we mean by “is”, then we can start to try to formulate a model of the Trinity to explicate its coherence. Not that I doubt it’s coherence, but it still seems as if it would be helpful to form some kind of specific model for the Trinity philosophically which is consistent with biblical theology. And as those assuming western tradition, perhaps it would be wise for us to heed some of Robert Letham’s criticisms of certain aspects of western Trinitarian theology in “The Holy Trinity” (2004), in which he raises his concerns with the western tradition tends to depersonalise God fundamentally into an impersonal essence, and only then deal with the personhood of the three divine persons after a conceptual base-root analysis of the essence called “God.”

    Anyway there’s just some thoughts you got rolling around in my head! Thanks for the blog post; it was great.

  2. You say ‘A is God’ is to assert that A has the property of being God.

    So you are saying ‘God’ is a property.
    Is there any limit to the number of objects with that property?

    In what sense, then, do we understand the First Commandment of the 10?

  3. Ian,

    Can God refer to himself as the one true God without having to reference the three parts? It seems anyone can make a commandment in relation to the whole of the entity. God seemingly can have three parts yet be one at the same time. Perhaps there is a level of application to humans as well? Being made in the image, can we not have the ability to be many parts in a whole? Maybe in the end we can opt out of this question like Saint Thomas Aquinas did, and say it is just too mysterious for our human minds to comprehend.

  4. Indeed it is possible to refer to a triplet of beings as if they were one. But presumably God sees things as they are, so he should be speaking truthfully. Especially if he expects us to be interested in him, and love him, as he is.

    Max’s original post did mention the possibility of using part/whole logic to understand the trinity (#3), but he did NOT recommend that way of understanding. Rather, he recommended understanding by predication (#2), which is different.

    It is always possible to opt out, as you say. But the title of this post is “The Logical Coherence of the Trinity”, which implies that opting out is not being allowed!

  5. “then I think we can have a coherent model of the Trinity” is hardly an inspiring endorsement!

    For me, there are a couple Biblical hurdles here:

    1. Jesus states that the Father is greater than He is. It seems to me that this is a “predication” is. However, if God really is a Being of which no greater can be conceived, than it seems difficult to see how Jesus can be God.

    2. Jesus also states that only the Father knew when the 2nd Coming was to occur. Christians attempt to sidestep this by saying that Jesus was human at the time and some weird human nature – God nature interaction either prevented Him from knowing this, or perhaps He voluntarily gave up this part of Himself. However, I’m not sure it is fully appreciated that no such excuse can be made for the Holy Spirit. Thus, it would seem like the Holy Spirit also does not have an “essential property” of God-ness: omniscience.

    So, if we’re to avoid contradiction by using “is” in the predicative sense, then it seems to me that the properties of Jesus and the Holy Spirit are clearly not God-like. And if we try to skirt this by using “is” in the Identity sense, then we run into the “problem” of polytheism. So, while I might not be able to rule out the coherence of a trinity concept, I’m not sure that any such concept would be warranted from scripture, and that would be the whole point of the exercise anyway.

  6. JB Chappell, some thoughts:

    With respect to Jn. 14:28, this is frequently taken out of context. For Jesus’ “the Father is greater than I” saying, we need to take into account the immediate context of Jesus’ conversation, which is to draw a strict between the Father’s current state of heavenly glory compared to the incarnate Word’s state of humiliation. Thus Jesus’ reference to the Father’s being greater than Christ signifies not supremacy of essence but supremacy of position or location, and now Jesus says he is going going back to the Father into the state of glory he had alongside the Father before the world was (cf. Jn. 17).

    As for the Father’s knowledge of the day of judgement, it is perfclt ycoherent to think that the incarnate Christ contained subconsious knowledge of the fact but did not bring it forth. It;s hard to bring the Holy Spirit into this, ince Jesus is talking to men about men, so I’m not sure the ifnerence can be made against him.

  7. I think we can conclude, on the the basis of the original post and the responses so far, that it has NOT yet been demonstrated that there exists a logically coherent account of the trinity that is also religiously satisfactory.

    • Ian, the power of trinitarianism lies in the biblical exegesis, and almost always theologians who object to this doctrine do so on the basis of philosophical theology first, which I find interesting. All the Trinitarian needs to do is to give a basic systematic account of these three scriptural facts: (1) monotheism, (2) coequality (which I think includes coeternity), and (3) tripersonality of this one God (cf. (1)). Then, the trinitarian might give a /possible/ description of this entity, such that, perhaps, three persons exist in or emerge from one essence (Latin Triintarianism), or maybe God is the ‘fount of deity’ out of whom the Spirit and the Word proceed and are begotten eternally (Greek Triniatarianism). Or maybe there is one personal being such as a soul (or howsoever construed) who is also tripersonal (what I take to be William Lane Craig’s view for instance). If any of these is even possible (and neither seems incoherent), then it follows that the Trinity is not contradictory.
      I would even go further as to say that no one has been able to prove that becasue God is a single personal being, that therefore God must be unipersonal. I don’t think that follows.

      So the Trinitarian puts forth biblical exegesis. Then he gives you a possible model. BUt you don’t believe it! How is this justified? You may reject his exegesis as false, and his models as /implausible/ (or who them to be impossible). But you must do more than that. You need to show that the Trinity really is self-referentially incoherent. So the discussion really needs to begin with how YOU understand what the Trinity actually is, and whether or not that is a fair definition or exposition of the concept. Otherwise you will just be talking past each other.

      • B.P, if you acknowledge that the trinitarian needs to at least show that their model is coherent, then I think you can see why theologians/philosophers would object to it on that basis. What Ian and I seem to agree on is that a “trinitarian” concept that could be supported by scripture would not be logically coherent, and any logically coherent concept of a trinity would not be religiously satisfying.

        So in the model above, the coherence is developed through different usages of the word “is”. The Trinity “is” God (identity). The Father “is” God (predication). The Son “is” God (predication). The Holy Spirit “is” God (predication). The collection of God the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit “is” the Trinity (constitution). It is in this way, a trinity concept is (supposedly) coherent.

        Again, the problem I see with this is that if the predication “is” amounts to a commitment to essential properties, then we have to determine what these essential properties of God are. The most traditional properties assigned to God are omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence – and this is done in light of God being defined as “that which no greater can be conceived” (or something similar). So, if we are to say that Jesus “is” God in the sense that we are making a commitment to God’s essential properties, then Jesus must have been omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent.

        For the sake of argument, I will simply grant your interpretation of John 14:28 at this point. Does Jesus have the “essential properties” of God? Even granting that Jesus admitting the Father being greater doesn’t mean Jesus’ “essential properties” are less, and that admission of ignorance was only referring to “conscious” knowledge, it seems plain that He was not omnipresent, right? This much has to be conceded if He is “returning” anywhere. So, the logically coherent model is not religiously satisfying (unless one doesn’t care for classical properties and definitions of God).

        Now, returning to scriptural exegesis… As for John 14:28, I think one CAN interpret it that way. The question is why you would. You say that the immediate context is that Jesus is delineating “between the Father’s current state of heavenly glory compared to the incarnate Word’s state of humiliation.” There is nothing within the text that makes that plain. The context is that Jesus is speaking of leaving this world, and that the Holy Spirit will come. In so doing, He happens to mention that the Father is “greater”. That the author of John thought that the pre-existent Logos was equivalent to God is clear, but there is nothing from this context that would prevent an interpretation of Jesus being “less” than God (not in identity, but in properties).

        Furthermore, I find it interesting that you refer to John 17 as supporting the idea that it is by virtue of Jesus’ location that He is not as great. If the degree of Jesus’ greatness is to be tied His location, then it makes no sense for Him to request God bestow Him with glory. It would simply be understood that He had it. So, it seems rather that the glory is something that is bestowed according to God’s will – that this would be determined by location seems odd indeed.

        Jesus also said that “among those born of women there has not arisen anyone greater than John the Baptist” (Matthew 11:11). Clearly, Jesus is not referring to John’s state of heavenly glory here. Jesus seems to think that He’s “less great” than both God and John the Baptist. At some point, we have to consider the fact that Jesus didn’t have some weird philosophical distinctions in mind when He said these things, but was probably speaking plainly.

  8. Oh, one more thing…. John 17:11b has an interesting remark by Jesus: “…Holy Father, protect them by the power of your name, the name you gave me, so that they may be one as we are one.”

    Now, i confess that I’m not entirely sure how to work this out. It isn’t clear to me why God’s protection, or the means of His protection (by His name? What does that mean?), would make us “one”, as opposed to not “one”. But it seems to me that the “one”-ness being implied here by Jesus is not at all the same kind of one-ness that Trinitarians hold to. I am willing to consider otherwise, but it just seems to me that if believers are all “one” (as the body of Christ, I presume?) in the same way that God is “one”, then this seems an awfully loose concept of unity, and in fact results in the Trinity being indistinguishable from polytheism.

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