There isn’t a straight line of demarcation between science and pseudoscience (PS), which is universally applicable in all fields categorized as scientific. A general guide for demarcating between the two is that the theory should have observable evidence, provides predictions, uses non-controversial reasoning, and is repeatable. These are simply guidelines and do not necessarily count as criteria for disqualifying a theory if all aren’t met because some are simply untenable depending on the field in which they are applied. Falsification is not necessary for a scientific theory but it does help substantiate the theory as a robust scientific theory.
When considering the criterion of observable evidence I make the distinction between observation and what is empirical. Something may be observed and qualify as evidence even though it’s not related to material causes. This is where the distinction between Duhemian science and Augustinian science must be made. I would deny the use of Duhemian science. This method, or philosophy, has a goal of stripping science from all metaphysical imports. Augustinian science is open to metaphysical presuppositions with science. In the mid 1800’s William Whewell was the first to restrict science to only mean natural science. Pierre Duhem followed this idea and constructed a methodology, which barred explanations to material causes. For instance, agent causation is completely compatible with Augustinian science but is prohibited as a scientific explanation in Duhemian science. Agent causation is something that can be observed but isn’t necessarily reductionistic in the material sense as with material causation because agent causation has metaphysical import.
Concerning the Duhemian science, this methodology is incapable of being achieved across disciplines. This would, by definition, remove psychological, sociological, and historical disciplines from being scientific since all require agent causation in explanation. Thus, the constraints of Duhemian science are untenable across the spectrum of [scientific] disciplines.
A scientific theory must be put in empirical harm’s way even though empirical evidence is not a necessary condition for a theory to be scientific. Scientific theories must be supported by facts and empirical evidence is certainly a sufficient condition for science and is preferred depending on the discipline. If the theory is based on facts then it should be able to withstand scrutiny when compared with relevant facts that could potentially falsify the theory. Contrary to Karl Popper’s line of demarcation between science and PS, a theory absent of evidence is not scientific—it’s mere speculation.[1] Popper’s model allows for a theory to be scientific prior to and supported evidence. There’s no positive case for purporting a theory under his model. There can only be anegative case to falsify it and as long as it may be potentially falsified, it’s scientific. Thus, a scientific theory could have not evidence or substantiated facts to provide good reasons for why it may be true.
I agree with Lakatos when he states that falsifiability is not the solution to the problem of demarcation in science.[2] Falsifiability is not a necessary condition for a scientific theory because it doesn’t meet its own requirements. Thus, falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a scientific theory and should be preferred. I believe a theory can have an anomaly in it and it’s completely acceptable for a theory to account for the anomaly. If a theory accounts for so many anomalies that the probability of the theory still being correct in light of these problems then the theory should be rendered inert. The theory needs to be abandoned as an appropriate scientific theory because at this point it’s probably a completely different theory than it had been originally. It should be reworked accounting for the, what were, anomalies as actual evidence for the theory.
Scientific theories should make predictions. This is a simple consequent to observation. If the theory is based on observed evidence, which is applicable to past observation and present observation than, if true, it should be observed in the future.
The reasoning process should be uncontroversial. Using empirical evidence is commonly accepted because it’s readily accessible to be observed by anyone. The interpretation of the data is where this is similar to the criterion of observability. This will determine if what is being observed is evidence for a theory of if it is not. Deductive reasoning may be used in scientific explanation but inductive or abductive reasoning is most preferred. Abductive reasoning is critical for the historical sciences. This serves well to the distinction between material causation and agent causation and why agent causation falls under observability. With reasoning by the inference to the best explanation, the best explanation may be an agent. Whatever the best explanation is, it cannot be contrived ad hoc or post hoc but must be related to the evidence and must follow from the evidence. When using non-deductive reasoning this allows for the explanans is not reached under logical control from fixed premises and that it follows from the apprehension of the data.
This follows contrary to Kant’s a priori fixed categories. Under Kantian categories one cannot know the Ding an Sich but the mind imposes its categories on to the explanandum. The explanans should explain causation as having more than just Hume’s causality where causality is deprived of being foundational in making necessary connections between actual events and leaving it with nothing more reliable than habits of mind rooted in association. This is important for historical sciences. Uniformitarianism, broadly speaking, must rely on the regularity of causality—presently known causes to phenomena may be inferred by the perceived effects are efficacious retroactively. The explanandum should be a posteriori as well as the explanans. A priori notions can be used in the reasoning process (using mathematics, semantic terms, etc.). However, the synthetic a priori should not be in the explanans and if it is contained with the explanandum the explanans cannot account for it (i.e. morality or mathematical proofs if math belongs in that category). Scientific theories must be a posteriori in its explanans because if this theory is to have any epistemic authority because epistemology follows from ontology (theory being epistemology and ontology being the observed data).
How I’m using the explanans and explanandum in relation to Kant’s categories arises the issues of rationalism and empiricism. Empiricism focuses on analytic a priori truths and synthetic a posteriori truths. I tend to be more of a rationalist in my approach. I do caution using the synthetic a priori in the explanandum.
Scientific theories should not have religious import. This may certain have tensions with Augustinian science but religious import is much more than mere metaphysical import. Religious belief imports something that is considered to be internally authoritative (as in within that system of belief). The applicability of some of the beliefs may be universal but using religious belief as a grid for interpreting what is and what is not science is methodologically irresponsible. Religious belief is not itself scientific but may have scientific beliefs and be in sync with science. There’s a categorical difference.
For instance, using Scripture to interpret science or empirical data is circular in its reasoning. Scripture would already have the conclusion and then uses the reasoning process to conclude with what Scripture may be advocating. Since I’m coming from a religious perspective I would argue that science and Scripture are harmonious and congruent. It’s necessary to have a scientific understanding of nature and agency prior to interpreting Scripture. In order to know a miracle has happened one must know that sea water is less dense than the human body, or that water doesn’t normally undergo chemical reactions to become fermented wine, or that dead bodies don’t normally undergo a natural biological resuscitation or resurrection. If creation science is an actual science then the antecedent conditions must be subject to scientific scrutiny. In other words, in order for creation science to be considered a scientific theory it must meet all the appropriate conditions I mentioned earlier. However, it’s not that creation science does or does not meet all that criteria, it’s that it’s dependent on an antecedent interpretation of Scripture.[3] Though I’m not as militant as Michael Ruse when classifying creation-science as pseudoscience I do believe it falls short of being a scientific theory. Additionally, what makes creation-science so unattractive is that it is completely void of the possibility of being falsifiable unless the antecedent conditions (the interpretation) have been falsified. This makes the issue of accounting for anomalies so absurd that creation-science doesn’t really account for anomalies; rather, it produces extreme ad hoc explanations to account for contradictions to its theory.[4] Lakatos includes this distinction between anomalies and refutations.[5] Refutations are falsifiers. Additionally, scientific theories are true regardless of any religious understanding. Religious belief, like I mentioned earlier, begs the question on certain scientific matters. Religious belief, when used as a hermeneutic for interpreting scientific data and developing scientific theories, is also a controversial methodology. Its appeal to method isn’t necessarily objective (as close to objectivity as can be) and is not commonly accepted (though not to be used as an argumentum ad populum). There’s no such thing as creation-science–there’s just science.
Repeatability is only applicable to certain categories of [scientific] disciplines. Repeatability has no applicable to historical sciences. The explanandum cannot necessarily always be repeated. Certainly, facets and contributions that bring about the explanandum could be repeated (i.e. what would happen in sedimentary formation in geology). Astrophysics cannot be repeated but can be continually observed. We can understand that stars use lighter elements for fuel and then proceed to consume up to iron, but this is a process that cannot be repeated. Also, galactic formation cannot be repeated. Repeatability is appropriate in laboratory sciences like biology and chemistry and may be used in social sciences on repeating certain experiments on subjects.
With regards to a litmus test to identify science from PS, the line of demarcation is straight and strong. The logical positivists made contributions to the methodology of science with their litmus test. Kurt Gödel’s proofs required that the positivist use a priori truths to explain away a priori truths. Their attempt was certainly admirable for science but their demarcation was too rigid and untenable. I would argue that something should be classified as pseudoscience if it contradicts any of the above criteria. There’s a difference between inconsistent or incongruent and contradiction. A theory may have anomalies or unknown ways of falsifiability but if the theory is utterly incapable of being falsified at any point it’s not scientific. A theory can be scientific if it is based on little evidence or observation but if there is none then it’s just as bad as Popperian science and pure speculation. Also, as an example, if a theory uses illogical reasoning then it should not be scientific (it can have controversial reasoning, which is not preferred, but it cannot be fallacious). I don’t think there’s such thing as a pseudo-question because science is not the sole source and means of epistemology. Any other non-scientific questions or theories may be legitimate in the field in which it applies (i.e. theology or ethics).
[1] See Imre Lakatos, “Science and Pseudoscience” in Philosophy of Science, Eds. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (New York: Norton, 1998), 22-23.
[2] Lakatos, 23.
[3] Michael Ruse, along similar lines, suggests that creationists use the data from non-creationists and warp the data to have a conclusion fitted to the preconceived idea of what it should say. Michael Ruse in “Creation-Science is Not Science” in Philosophy of Science, Eds. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (New York: Norton, 1998), 43. This circular reasoning is worse than Kant’s use of having fixed premises from his categories by which he used deductive means to arrive at a conclusion. Creation-science does not allow for free invention of hypotheses derived from the evidence. This is different from mere invention where science is a human institution, something we invented to organize our experiences and enhance our technological control of nature. Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science ed. 3 (New York: Routledge, 2012), 53. Free invention is more in sync with discovery contra Kant. This free invention could be likened to an exegesis of nature.
[4] Following the idea presented by Ruse. 43.
[5] Lakatos, 23.
January 14, 2013 at 18:27
Very interesting read. So I guess the obvious question in response is how do you account for the ever so advancing field of mathematics? Would you say most of math is just jigsaw puzzles, limitless information that seeks to solve the riddles of symbols? Purely logic, but limited in evidence. How would you describe the mathematics?
January 16, 2013 at 14:59
In my opinion, the logical proof of any mathematical problem is sufficient as evidence of its truth, though it is important to identify if this truth is maintained under all conditions. As a student of math, I feel all areas of math have an application. Some areas of math are more obscure in its direct application and may be hidden behind several layers. One simply has to work through the details and see its relation, perhaps, to other areas of math, or its application to novel areas.
I feel that, being Human and limited to the nature God has created, math will not help us to create nature, but to discover it more. With math, we are able to extend our perspective, using information gathered from nature, for application to ideas and behaviors which exist, but have not been proven or described yet. Perhaps an interesting question is if math, being a description of nature and bounded by nature, can be extended to describe the super-natural?
January 29, 2013 at 17:48
Max. Interesting read about science and pseudo science. I enjoyed your explanation as to science and pseudo science. I want to discuss this section
“Scientific theories should not have religious import. This may certain have tensions with Augustinian science but religious import is much more than mere metaphysical import. Religious belief imports something that is considered to be internally authoritative (as in within that system of belief). The applicability of some of the beliefs may be universal but using religious belief as a grid for interpreting what is and what is not science is methodologically irresponsible. Religious belief is not itself scientific but may have scientific beliefs and in sync with science. There’s a categorical difference.”
Fundamental in your analysis is the apparently clarity you feel between the categories of Religion and Science. At least on first appearance you seem to have very clear demarcations between the two. IE you seem to be able to succinctly differentiate between the two as if one has nothing in common with the other. To be fair, this is a product of necessity. How could we ever discuss different things if we could willy nilly mix them together when ever it suited us. Distinctions are helpful and necessary. We need them. I want to be clear that I stand with you on Creation science. I have some problems with it’s hermeneutics.
The situation however, is simply more complicated. Science deals with metaphysics (as you rightly pointed out) in that it discusses what is or is not, what does or does not affect things / exists. The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth is an temporal event. It either happened or it did not happen. In this way religion and Science overlap to a very great degree. Scientific “discoveries” have a fantastic import to religious discussions esp Christianity. Buddhism however, is a religion that does not claim to be temporal, it is the question of accepting the 5 fold path. Whether or not you accept it as truth cannot be verified nor falsified. So the result is that the “category” of religion is a very broad definition indeed, acting as an umbrella to “catch” as many things as we wish to place within it.
Now the point is this: to say that religion and science should never overlap is to 1) ignore the reality that it depends VERY much on the belief system you are talking about. 2) Ignores the metaphysical “claims” and epistemological import of much of science.
Science isn’t simply a collection of axioms we use to blow stuff up. When we talk about molecules and chemistry we are making epistemological assertions about what fundamentally is or is not. This is illustrated overwhelming by the roll naturalistic materialism plays in the scientific culture/practice. While scientists can claim: We make no religious claims. It depends greatly upon how a person understands and uses the word “religion”. If you define religion to mean: A set of beliefs that is ardently adhered to by followers. Than naturalistic materialism itself would definitely be a religion. But if you mean, a religion is a set of beliefs that can neither be abductively, deductively or inductively proven just believed, than Christianity, is not a religious belief. (Ie I’m a Christian because I believe Jesus is God’s Son, precisely because of the resurrection. No resurrection, I don’t believe. Period.)
The point is that science, atheists and natural materialist have a high motive to keep this distinction intact. It promotes their belief system that they are not “religions” but rather “facts” about the world. When you can sit in a class room and have a professor talk about materialism as if it is a fact of the world and belittle all other beliefs how is that NOT an advantage?
They have been using categories like “religion”, and “science” to manipulate people into believing certain things. Richard Dawkins, Harris, Denett, are prime examples. Where does Dawkin’s science break away into his belief system? When does Sam Harris stop being a philosopher and begin being a priest of scientism? Distinctions are useful as long as they are not manipulated and used in bad faith. Science has evolved into an entire faith system, but because it sits in a different category it is except from “religious” rules.
“using religious belief as a grid for interpreting what is and what is not science is methodologically irresponsible.”
Look up on youtube the debate between John Lenox and Peter Atkins (dueling professors). Atkins certainly uses his naturalistic materialism as a grid for determining what must happen in science. An agent causing the universe to begin CANNOT be allowed. This is following the meta-narrative of materialism regardless of the evidence.
We both can disagree with Creation science, but there is very little distinction between what Ken Ham is hermeneutically doing with Genesis and what Atkins is doing with his philosophy. Both are frame works being overlaid on top of the evidence. The distinction is simply one of category. Atkins belief system is labeled “scientific” while Ham’s is labeled “religious”. For me that’s using categories to make a case of special pleading. ie it’s bad when Ken ham does it , but understandable when Atkins does it.
January 29, 2013 at 19:36
I never said that religion and science don’t overlap. I said that religion should not have an import for determining and interpreting scientific data. There’s also a great difference between metaphysical import and religious import. Religious import would be an example o young earth creationism. There’s a particular interpretation of an authoritative source and then interpreting the scientific/empirical data in a manner solely based on a logically prior religious interpretation/import. This is different from, say, agent causation, which is a metaphysical import. So, when we discuss whether or not the universe is closed or open to outside causation that’s a philosophical issue that concerns agent causation. This discussion becomes important on, say, what can cause the wave function collapse and determine the outcome of a particle. That’s a metaphysical concern as to whether or not mind can do such things (both God and human). Science also informs our metaphysics.
The resurrection of Jesus is certainly a historical event. I’m not saying that historical events pertinent to religion are by definition non-scientific. It’s science that informs religion here. How does one identify a miracle? Science and philosophy. We cannot know if the resurrection was a miracle unless we know it’s the case that dead organisms, animals, and people do not naturally come back to life. We do not know if walking on water is a miracle unless we know that water is less dense than the human body and therefore human bodies cannot walk on water. You’re using ‘overlap’ here in an ambiguous way too, so I’m not quite sure what you mean given your example of the resurrection here.
Concerning your 1: I already said that overlapping occurs but the problem is with religious (primarily religious authority) has import in how we interpret the scientific data. Sure, there are different belief systems/religion that we are referring to but atheism, as you mention later on, is not a religion and thus does not have religious import. I’m hesitant to make an equivocation here but it seems that you equivocate religion with a belief system. Concerning 2: I don’t see how this follows. I said that we do and must have metaphysical import for science. I discuss this in great detail in the following posts.
http://sententias.org/2012/04/21/science-and-epistemology-part-1/
http://sententias.org/2012/04/22/science-and-epistemology-part-2/
http://sententias.org/2013/01/02/which-comes-first-science-or-philosophy/
Religion isn’t a set of beliefs that ardently adhered to by followers. That makes baseball a religion since a group of individuals follow the rules of baseball. Typically, a source of authority, worship, key doctrines from this authority, and beliefs about the human condition and the source of ultimate reality and our response and role in it are sufficient but not necessary conditions for religion (i.e. the typical major religions of the world). I would not consider naturalism or atheism to be religions. They may be able to meet certain conditions here but I think they would be prime examples of the negation of religion. Religion is neither a set of beliefs that are believed via deduction, induction, or abduction. I can make an inductive argument that a designer (architect) designed my house. That’s not a religious belief.
I’m not trying to being overly technical with the definition of religion. I used it in the prima facie sense that most people understand the word ‘religion’ to mean, which excludes atheism and naturalism.
If a naturalistic materialist uses his naturalistic materialism to interpret science then it’s not a problem of religious import but a problem of circular reasoning. Naturalistic materialism should be a conclusion and not a method just like Christianity should be a conclusion and not a method (scientifically speaking). Methodological naturalism is more in sync with the issue of interpretation. This is where the debate rests concerning metaphysical import. For instance, a methodological naturalist will not allow agent causation as a legitimate explanatory hypothesis whereas an Augustinian could. Your example of agent causation concerning the beginning of the universe is a great example of metaphysical import.
There is a difference between Ham and Atikins. Ham has religious import and Atkins has a different metaphysical import. Metaphysical import is a necessary condition for religious import, obviously, and that’s where the debate rests–whether or not metaphysical import is a legitimate approach to the philosophy of science. Atkins can call his position “scientific” just as anyone can label their belief “scientific” but the demarcation between them, at least in the examples we’ve been using, are philosophical distinctions in metaphysical import (though Ham goes further than mere metaphysical import by importing a particular interpretation of the Bible into his science).
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February 11, 2013 at 09:31