It appears that what you really struggle with is not the validity of the argument but perhaps the mode of which we use. By this I simply mean that you have a problem with moving from Logic to the real. However, I see the ontological argument as perhaps the most fundamental axiom that can show that by the definition we have of God, it leads to him existing necessarily (within the logical world at least). Now, from what it seems you have trouble moving from the world of logic to the real world. That is why you reference a computer program. But I must say, even the algorithms embedded within the confines of an Operating System, or a simple game of Chess, are applicable to the real world. I can use an Operating System, I can apply the logic to a game of chess, and so on.

An even more pressing matter deals with the language. Heidegger believed that language was not just the arbitrary use of utterances, instead it is a tool to represent reality itself. If that were the case, and when I say “There is a duck”, I am making a reference to reality itself, acknowledging all the attributes of that statement, (i.e. there is, and ducks are those objects which are white, quack a bunch, etc.). What makes Anselm’s version, or the original version, more interesting is the language. One may say, “God [if he/she were to exist] is a being on which no greater can be CONCEIVED.”

Alright, I can conceive of this being, all infinite, powerful (from my perspective), morally perfect, and the list goes on. Well in order for that being to be all powerful, even from my own perspective, rests on the great making principle that it must exist. From our own perspectives, since we know we exist, then in relation to us this being would only be greater if it existed in reality as well.

Beyond that, I believe everyone has the argument down along with the contemporary versions. But, to tie this together, the language is what is so important here. Something special about the way we bring these words together and the way they relate to one another. Almost every great “problem” in logic is a word game. One simply cannot squeeze between the net of the issue on the grounds of it being word games, or semantics. God by definition within the conceptual ability of human beings is a being of which none greater can be conceived. Traditionally this is accepted, “even the fool knoweth in his heart.” And if language, is the tool that is of reality itself, then we would be in the wrong to say that this conception were not true.

Maybe moving from logic to reality is a troubling step, often framed with trial and error. But we make this jump everyday of our lives. For instance, technology is perhaps the epitome of making the jump from logic to the real. And computer programmers do this everyday! For instance, the conceptual use of ideas brought together the Iphone, Ipad, and other great products. The conceptual work of artists brought to life Peter Jackson’s adaption of The Hobbit. We can so conceive, and we can so make the move from the understanding to the real. In fact, this example was used by Anselm though most neglect it.

So in relation to God, why not have the conception and why not move from logic to real? Though I mentioned things that can be seen and touched, perhaps a timeless figure like God does in fact exist, and we have such a simple axiom to show it.

It all comes down to moving from the logic to the real, does a deductive syllogism say something about reality or it just a construct of the human mind, riddled with word games?

See also, Kurt Gödel’s version, its enticing.

See also, Descartes’ version, illustrates it using mathematics.

Firstly, if we can’t *exclude* the possibility of a “maximally great being” existing, that is not the same as saying that there is a possible world in which a MGB exists.

If you cannot exclude the possibility of a MGB existing then that’s logically equivalent of saying it’s possible that a MGB exists, which is saying there’s a possible world in which MGB exists… This is just false.

But the problem (secondly) comes where Plantinga shifts the ontological positioning of his MGB. Note that he starts out by proposing the existence of APWs without reference to his MGB (this is very clearly implied, but not stated, and since many philosophers are happy with the notion of APWs we don’t need to get our pants in a twist). He then references SPW that contains his MGB – i.e. he has explicitly rendered his MGB ontologically *dependent* on that SPW (forgive my poor grammatical rendering of these concepts; I’m sure you’re keeping with my drift on this). Let’s call this world the MGB exists *in* PW1.

I’m not understanding your abbreviations. If by APW you mean all possible worlds then it’s true that if a MGB exists in one pw then it follows that MGB exists in all pw. Why? Because existence is greater than non-existence. SPW = some possible world? You’ve actually got it backwards. Plantinga starts with some possible world and then shifts to all possible worlds because existence is greater than non-existence and if that’s true it follows that MGB exists in all possible worlds.

So we have:
APW –> PW1 –> MGB-in-PW1

What he then does is pull a cheat by simply asserting that the MG bit of his MBG can jump out of the ontology and apply to APW, but that is at the very best a sleight of hand. If you’re running an ontological argument you simply can’t do that. But of course he thinks he *can* do that because he has pretend-defined it into MG.

Again, you never defined your abbreviations but if I interpreted them correctly then you’re missing one. So, how is existence being greater than non-existence (entailed by MGB having maximally great properties) slight of hand? It’s modal logic and it works. I have never read a philosopher who denies this. Everyone I’ve heard of and read (professionally) must deny premise 1, that MGB is possible, because the whole argument is valid and it follows. So, one can do this because it follows logically…

This renders Plantinga’s argument absurd. Here is an example of reformulating it.

1. It is possible that a maximally in-a-box frog (MBF) exists.
2. If it is possible that a MBF exists, then a MBF exists in SPB (some possible box)
3. If a MBF exists in SPB then a MBF exists in APB (all possible boxes)
4. If a MBF exists in APB then a MBF exists in your shoebox
5. If your shoebox exists, then a MBF exists. (5b. You have a shoebox)
6. Therefore a MBF exists.

Which is quite evidently silly. I would suggest that Plantinga’s effort is likewise silly, and you shouldn’t waste your time on it, or Anselm’s effort either.

I really hope you’re not being serious because this is horrible. This demonstrates that you never understood the first premise to begin with and you’re making a horrible example of Gaunilo. At least his objection was interesting. This is just bad. Gaunilo proposes the idea of a perfect island. “I can conceive of a perfect island so this perfect island must exist.” The problem with this is that the island could, actually, always be improved. How many palm trees? How big is the island? How nice is the weather? Inevitably, when you start adding every great making property to the island you will get to Anselm’s notion of God. (Now just substitute perfect island with your frog…)

So we have:
APW –> PW1 –> MGB-in-PW1

What he then does is pull a cheat by simply asserting that the MG bit of his MBG can jump out of the ontology and apply to APW, but that is at the very best a sleight of hand. If you’re running an ontological argument you simply can’t do that. But of course he thinks he *can* do that because he has pretend-defined it into MG.

This renders Plantinga’s argument absurd. Here is an example of reformulating it.

1. It is possible that a maximally in-a-box frog (MBF) exists.
2. If it is possible that a MBF exists, then a MBF exists in SPB (some possible box)
3. If a MBF exists in SPB then a MBF exists in APB (all possible boxes)
4. If a MBF exists in APB then a MBF exists in your shoebox
5. If your shoebox exists, then a MBF exists. (5b. You have a shoebox)
6. Therefore a MBF exists.

Which is quite evidently silly. I would suggest that Plantinga’s effort is likewise silly, and you shouldn’t waste your time on it, or Anselm’s effort either.

I would also like to add that positing anything physical is an error by the objector. Physical objects depend on space for their existence and hence fail to maintain maximal greatness in at least one respect because their existence is contingent upon space.

What about Plantinga’s formulation?

(MGB = Maximally Great Being, SPW = Some Possible World, APW = All Possible Worlds, AW = Actual World)

1) It is possible that a MGB exists.
2) If it is possible that a MGB exists, then a MGB exists in SPW.
3) If a MGB exists in SPW, then a MGB exists in APW.
4) If a MGB exists in APW, then a MGB exists in the AW.
5) If a MGB exists in the AW, then a MGB exists.
6) Therefore, a MGB exists.

There is nothing question begging about this argument. P1 is the focal point of this argument, and we’ve simply seen no good reason to doubt the possibility of a MGB.

As for Anselm, you’re simply wrong, and appear not to have understood the problem. It’s a word game, and does not permit you to reach a conclusion about reality. The ontic status of “what can be conceived” is critical to the argument; once you realise that that is a con, the argument crashes.

Again, when dealing with both these flawed arguments, I would encourage you to think like a computer programmer.

How exactly does Plantinga’s MOA beg the question? All deductive arguments have the conclusion embedded within the major premise–such is the nature of every deductive argument. It only begs the question if one *only* believes P1 to be true because he already accepts the conclusion, but with Plantinga’s MOA, this just isn’t the case. So in order to show the MOA to be false you have to show that a MGB is metaphysically impossible, which has not been done.