In this post I’ll be responding to R.A. Fumerton’s “Inferential Justification and Empiricism” in The Journal of Philosophy 73/17 (1976).

In this paper Fumerton argues for the empiricist’s version of foundationalism.  He draws important distinctions between senses of how one may be inferentially justified.  His argument is matched against another argument, which proceeds from observations about what we do and do not infer.  His primary contention is that is that one can never have a noninfterentially justified belief in a physical-object proposition.  One must always justify one’s beliefs in propositions about the physical world by appealing to other beliefs or basic beliefs; a thesis I disagree with.

I will be faithful to knowledge being defined as a justified true belief.  The task that is of concern in this paper is to examine the coherence of inferential reasoning in a foundationalist’s system.  A problem with inference to the best explanation (IBE) is that it has the potential to create an infinite regress.  With inferential reasoning, in an attempt to justify a belief in proposition P there may be an appeal to another proposition (or set of propositions) E, and by either explicitly or implicitly appeal to a third proposition, that E confirms or makes P probable.  The challenge of inferential justification challenges one of two propositions:

(1) That we are justified in believing E.

(2) That we are justified in believing that E confirms P.

Fumerton certainly addresses the issue that this regress problem is escapable by appealing to noninfterentially justified belief, that is, a belief justified without being justified through the justification of another belief.  What is attractive about these, otherwise known as basic beliefs, are that he does not refer to them as being unjustified justifiers.  These noninfterentially justified beliefs or, basic beliefs, still remain faithful to the notion that knowledge is justified true belief.  Beliefs that must be justified through the justification of other beliefs are inferentially justified beliefs.  A person who claims that one can have a noninfterentially justified belief in some proposition asserting the existence of a physical object is an epistemological direct realist.

Fumerton’s focus is assessing Anthony Quinton’s objection against empiricism (or more generally against any thesis that contradicts epistemological direct realism).  Quinton’s claim is that the justification of our beliefs in propositions describing physical objects is always inferential and that it is always from propositions about the nature of our experiences that such inferences are made.  With this said, there are two conditions that must be satisfied for Quinton concerning inferential belief in physical objects:

(3) Statements about experience must count as reasons or evidence for statements about objects.

(4) Statements about experience must in some, no doubt rather obscure, sense be accepted by those who make statements about objects.

Fumerton agrees with Quinton when doubt is cast on (3) and (4) by simply suggesting that that it is not always the case that most people are always in the “appropriate, sophisticated, phenomenological frame of mind.”  This is certainly true to an extent; so let us refer to this handicap as H.  It may be the case person S is intoxicated with alcohol and his phenomenological apprehension may be malfunctioning or that S realizes that his phenomenological apprehension of the external world is not as it should be and is capable of recognizing malfunction.  For example, Lewis knows that he had too much to drink and that his phenomenological faculties are not functioning as they should.  Lewis decides to go to bed to sleep off his state of mind and he walks into the bathroom to brush his teeth.  His toothbrush has always been in the same holder since he moved in years ago.  He looks down at his toothbrush and it appears to him that his it is actually moving around in circles.  Lewis, knowing he has had too much to drink and is aware of what usually happens when one drinks too much, realizes that his toothbrush is most likely still and that his faculties are malfunctioning.  Lewis comes to the belief that his toothbrush is stationary despite the appearance that it is not. Thus, does not negate the fact that H may be factored in to justification, namely:

(5) Statements about experience conform to (3) and/or (4) when S’s phenomenological faculties are malfunctioning but are consciously corrected or accounted for.

When there is good reason to disregard (3) and (4) is when S believes that his phenomenological faculties are functioning appropriately when, in fact, they are not function properly.  This would certainly qualify as being delusory.  It may also be the case that S’s phenomenological faculties are not functioning properly when he believes they are and yet, by corrective happenstance, how S arrives at a true belief rests with the Gettier problem, which will not be addressed here.

Fumerton continues to discuss an objection to empiricism based on the entertainment of sensational or experiential propositions. They are:

(A) That we seldom if ever consciously infer propositions about objects from propositions about experiences.
(B) That most people, if challenged as to their justification for believing propositions about the external world, would seldom if ever offer as their reasons or evidence propositions about experiences.
(C) That it is quite meaningless, that it makes no sense to search for evidence justifying a belief in the existence of a physical object that is before one under optimum conditions of perception.

Certainly, (A) may be true but is agreeably not critical to the empiricist’s defense.  Both (B) and (C) may be true or false to a certain degree but is hardly relevant to the validity of an empiricist’s foundationalism.  The concern is the logical order of justification rather than psychological or historical order.  Fumerton yields more consideration to (B) with an example of beliefs which would have to be inferentially justified but are not usually if ever consciously inferred from that which would constitute evidence, which would be beliefs about the future or subjunctive conditionals.  The belief that this glass of water in front of me will quench my thirst if I drink it is not inferred back from previous experiences coupled with an application of a synthetic a priori principle of induction.  Though this example is not how we form our beliefs psychologically or historically, it can be formed via instances of past experience and induction in the logical sense.

Fumerton provides two definitions for what it means to say that one has inferential justification.  After considering these definitions I want to argue a criticism that an empiricist foundational structure allows for and, perhaps, necessitates an epistemological direct realism.

D1 S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E. = Df.

(1) S believes P.
(2) S justifiably believes both E and the proposition that E confirms P.
(3) S believes P because he believes both E and the proposition that E confirms P.
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and that E&X does not confirm P.

D2 S has an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E. = Df.

(1) S believes P.
(2) E confirms P.
(3) The fact that E causes S to believe P.
(4) There is no proposition X such that S is justified in believing X and that E&X does not confirm P.

Given the explications of such definitions, both D1 and D2, there seems to be good grounds for believing that P must be inferentially justified.  It is most certainly that case that D2 is more amenable to having scientific knowledge in the sense that both (2) and (3) are confirmatory.  D2-(3) is certainly difficult to substantiate without begging the question.  Having E cause S to believe P is difficult to distance from some form of transitive relation.  I have little contention with such definitions of inferential justification; my concern is whether this is most amicable within a foundationalist’s or coherentist’s noetic structure.

Both D1 and D2 offer, I believe to be, successful accounts of inferential justification.  However, I do find both definitions to be problematic for the empiricist on the bases of foundationalism, of which I will argue that such inferential justification and non-epistemological direct realism is more amicable to the coherentist and that a non-epistemological realist who adheres to foundationalism cannot successfully account for new beliefs.

Such inferential justification is certainly compatible with foundationalism but making all empirical claims to be inferential seems to be over-committing to inferential reasoning.  Suppose I am walking in the field and on the next hill over I see an object.  For all purposes, my phenomenological faculties indicate to me that there is something on the next hill.  This belief is held for a reason, primarily that my phenomenological faculties inform me that something is on the next hill over, but this is not a reasoned belief.  I may certainly infer certain properties consistent with D1 and D2 such as the belief that the object has a particular color or that it omits a certain sound or that it has a particular smell.  My belief that an object is on the next hill over from me seems to be quite basic.  I am not inferring its existence from other object-likenesses.  I am completely unaware as to the identity of this object, or better yet, whether this object is unique or unknown.  Suppose that this object has never been known before I experienced it.  This makes the situation quite different from Fumerton’s glass of water and is not a future tensed proposition nor is it a subjunctive conditional.

Inferential reasoning as described by D1 and D2 are certainly kind to empiricism when it comes to scientific knowledge.  Certain unknown entities may become known by inferential means.  We can infer the existence of protons, quarks, and other elementary particles by predicting what effects such entities may have in certain situations.  This may be causal in nature and may be confirmed by inference. However, it is not the case that we directly experience the existence of these particles (for all intensive purposes, it certainly is the case that we experience particles when we run in to a wall and even then we experience the strong nuclear force over the particles). Nevertheless, epistemological direct realism and new belief formation can be non-inferentially justified.[1]

Inferentially justified empirical beliefs are more in sync with a coherentist noetic structure.  When making inferential claims the proposition being inferred from must cohere to a proposition already accepted as truth.  Inferential propositions may be foundational as well, but if empirical claims are strictly inferential then coherentism is best suited.  No matter what the belief in question is to be it must be inferentially referred back to another experientially valid belief (within the scope of empirical discussion).

It appears that Fumerton has done well in defending the empiricist position.  His commitment to foundationalism is not necessary for his empiricism since his empiricism it what seems to have priority over his foundationalism.  His arguments against an epistemological direct realist seem to fall short of being compelling.  They are certainly reinforcing the idea of empirical inferential reasoning but are not sufficient to make empiricism exclusive to inferential reasoning alone removing the validity of epistemological direct realism.

Posted on Friday, October 5th, 2012 at 10:00 in Epistemology   |  RSS feed |  Respond  |  Trackback URL