J.M.E. McTaggart provides an objection to the A series of time but suggesting that it may be true that past, present, and future are mere illusions of the mind. McTaggart dismisses the argument’s subjectivity of time by simply defining it out of existence.
1. Anything existent can either possess the characteristic of being in time or the characteristic of not being in time.
2. Anything existent does not possess the characteristic of being in time [due to subjective references, a lack of indexing events from moment to moment or changing, etc.]
3. Therefore, anything existent does not possess the characteristic of being in time (time is illusory).
The objection to the A series by the subjectivity of the individual mind is not so easy to dismiss as McTaggart seems to do. With advances in relativity theory this objection may have phenomenological credibility. Though McTaggart’s rejection of the argument is correct, there are better reasons for opposing the argument of the mind’s subjective relationship to time.