Review of Mark Nowacki’s “Assessing the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Philosophia Christi 12 (2010): 201-212.
Mark Nowacki’s article is in response to an ongoing dialogue between himself and Arnold Guminski. Guminski had recently written critiques of Nowacki’s version of the kalam cosmological argument and Nowacki responds by clarifying misconceptions and elaborating on key premises to the argument. Nowacki’s argument is based on the impossibility of an actual infinite magnitude [not multitude] with respects to temporal marks.
Nowacki begins by developing an account of modality called substantial modality with respects to substances that obtain in the actual universe. Substantial possibility is a more restricted domain than logical possibility. Substantial possibility is the domain of possibility that tracks what is causally open to substances as a function of the particular natures that those substances possess. Anything that is substantially possible is logically possible, but the converse does not hold: something maybe logically possible without being substantially possible.[1] One substantially necessary feature for any physical body is that it possesses a definite shape.






