Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457) developed the interrogative (interrogatio) rather than the problematic (quaestio) form of inquiry. Valla’s mode of inquiry was one in which questions yield results that are entirely new, giving rise to knowledge that cannot be derived by an inferential process from what was already known. This method was similar to the works of Stoic lawyers and educators like Cicero and Quintilian; that is, questioning witnesses, investigating documents and states of affairs without any prior conception of what the truth might be. Valla transitioned from not only using this method for historical knowledge but also applied it as “logic for scientific discovery.”
Valla’s logic for scientific discovery was the art of finding out things rather than merely the art of drawing distinctions and connecting them together. He called for an active inquiry (activa inquisitio). John Calvin (1509-1564) applied this method to the interpretation of Scripture and thus became the father of modern biblical exegesis and interpretation. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) applied it to the interpretation of the books of nature, as well as to the books of God, and became the father of modern empirical science.
This methodology created a split between subject and object, knowing and being, and gave rise to phenomenalism. Newton claimed that he invented no hypotheses but deduced them from observations produced rationalistic positivism, which engulfed contemporary European science. This split’s gulf was widened by David Hume’s (1711-1776) criticism of causality, depriving science of any valid foundation in necessary connections obtaining between actual events and of leaving it with nothing more reliable than habits of mind rooted in association. Hume weighed heavy in Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) philosophical development. Given the Newtonian understanding of space and time, Kant transferred absolute space and time from the divine sensorium to the mind of man (the transfer of the inertial system), thus intellect does not draw its laws out of nature but imposes its laws upon nature. According to Kant one cannot know the Ding an Sich (thing itself) by pure reason; one is therefore limited to the sensual and shaping mental categories of the mind. That which comes through sensation the intuitions are shaped by the mind’s a priori categories. It is in this sense that Kant played an essential part in the development of the idea that man is himself the creator of the scientific world.
Throughout Einstein’s work, the mechanistic universe proved unsatisfactory. This was made evident after the discovery of the electromagnetic field and the failure of Newtonian physics to account for it in mechanistic concepts. Then came the discovery of four-dimensional geometry and with it the realization that the geometrical structures of Newtonian physics could not be detached from changes in space and time with which field theory operated. Einstein stepped back into stride with Newton and his cognitive instrument of free invention. It was free in the sense that conclusions were not reached under logical control from fixed premises, and it was invented under the pressure of the nature of the universe upon the intuitive apprehension of it. Einstein used Newton and Maxwell’s partial differential equations in field theory to develop a mode of rationality called mathematical invariance. Mathematical invariance established a genuine ontology in which the subject grips with objective structures and intrinsic intelligibility of the universe.
Einstein’s categories are not some form of Kantian a priori but conceptions that are freely invented and are to be judged by their usefulness, their ability to advance the intelligibility of the world, which is dependent of the observer. As he sees it, the difference between his own thinking and Kant’s is on just this point: Einstein understands the categories as free inventions rather than as unalterable (conditioned by the nature of the understanding). Einstein asserts that the real in physics is to be taken as a type of program, to which one is not forced to cling a priori.
Principles of method are closely related to empirical observations. As Einstein put it, “the scientist has to worm these general principles out of nature by perceiving in comprehensive complexes of empirical facts certain general features which permit of precise formulation.” These principles, not “isolated general laws abstracted from experience” or “separate results from empirical research,” provide the basis of deductive reasoning.
There is a long tradition within Christian theology of drawing on intellectual resources outside the Christian tradition as a means of developing a theological vision. This approach is often referred to by the Latin phrase ancilla theologiae (a ‘handmaid of theology’). The evolution of thought and method from Newton to Einstein vitalized scientific theology. Scientific theology argues that the working methods and assumptions of the natural sciences represent the best—or the natural—dialogue partner for Christian theology.
Here too logico-deductive argumentation from static concepts and mechanistic systems are rejected. There is another reorientation of man’s knowledge leaving epistemic and cosmological dualism behind in operations that have to do with the unity of form and being. Scientific theology is concerned with the discovery of appropriate modes of rationality or cognitive instruments with which to enter into the heart of religious experience, and therefore with the development of axiomatic concepts with which to allow interior principles to be disclosed, and in that light to understand the rational structure of the whole field of God’s interaction with man and the world.
Scientific theology takes Einstein’s knowing and being and his understanding of reality as a whole and applies this method of theology in Christian theology. If the world is indeed the creation of God, then there is an ontological ground for a theological engagement with the natural sciences. It is not an arbitrary engagement, which regresses back to Newtonian engagement, but it is a natural dialogue, grounded in the fundamental belief that the God about whom Christian theology speaks is the same God who created the world that the natural sciences investigate.
 Thomas F. Torrance, “Einstein and Scientific Theology,” Religious Studies 8 no. 3 (1972): 236-237.
 Valla served in conjunction with Andrea Alciati (1492-1550) as Calvin’s primary influence for his biblical interpretation.
 Torrance, 237.
 Ibid., 240.
 Ibid., 241-242.
 Donna Teevan, “Albert Einstein and Bernard Lonergan on Empirical Method,” Zygon 37 no. 4 (2002): 875-876.
 Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, Trans. and rev. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Three Rivers, 1982), 221.
 Teevan, 877.
 Alister E. McGrath, The Science of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 18-19. There are five distinct classes of things—time, space, matter, energy, and the things relating to conscious life—form with their combinations the known universe. The fifth class must, like the previous, be permanent in quantity, variable in form, and cannot be destroyed. This may be simply labeled as “spirit.” In natural science dialogues, this element is often referred to as “God,” though it does not necessarily carry the theological meanings with it. This, perhaps, is the sense in which Einstein meant the term “God.” T. Proctor Hall, “Scientific Theology,” Monist 23 (1913): 95.
 Torrance, 244.
 Both the natural sciences and Christian theology are to engage with the nature of reality—not deciding this in advance, but exploring and establishing it through a process of discovery and encounter. McGrath, The Science of God, 21-22.